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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary water uses in Colorado have evolved from mining to
agriculture to large-scale municipal and industrial uses. There is, however, another emerging water use moving onto the stage, and that is
recreation. The phenomenal surge in the demand for water for recreation reflects both the changing nature of Colorado's economy, and
the flexibility found in existing water law and policy. This paper focuses on the significant evolution of Colorado water law between 1997
and 2006 that has created greater security for recreational water rights.
A recreational water right is based on the traditional concepts of
water appropriation in Colorado. First, there is a diversion of water by
structures that concentrate and control specified flows. Second, there
is beneficial use as these diversion structures create water features that
are used by kayakers, canoeists, rafters, inner tubers, and other boaters.
Third, there is a need to protect a community's investment in its "boating park" and the recreation based economies that have that have
grown around these parks. This is accomplished by obtaining a priority for a water right sufficient to protect the recreational use against
future upstream diversions and exchanges. In short, just like a traditional water right appropriation for any other purpose, recreational
water rights involve a direct human use of water to generate an economic benefit that is protected under the priority system.
But that is where the tradition ends. The recreational water rights
that are the subject of this paper are diverted and used within the historic stream channel. In the eyes of many of Colorado's most powerful
water users-sometimes referred to as the "water buffaloes"-when it
comes to water appropriation, "traditional" has meant only out-ofchannel diversion and water consumption. The only exceptions tolerated were hydropower uses and the State-owned minimum instream
flows to protect the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
While the latter water rights are instream, non-consumptive uses like
recreational water rights, they have been tolerated because they are
limited to very low flows and may not be appropriated or owned by
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local governments or private parties. Instream flows may only be held
by the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"), a state board
generally controlled by traditional water users. In a dry year like 2002,
when those minimum streamflows needed to be enforced the most,
Colorado water politics prevented the CWCB from calling for any of its
instream flows during the entire irrigation and domestic storage season.
The recreation water rights discussed in this paper are different
from the state-held minimum stream flows. First, they involve control
and possession of water using man-made structures. Second, they are
for beneficial uses of certain flows of water at and between the structures. Third, they are not appropriated directly for environmental
purposes, but for recreation use, and the appropriator is putting water
to use for economic benefit. Most significantly, unlike CWCB-held
instream flows, the new recreation water rights have been secured for
very large flows. To the traditionalist water buffaloes, these large, nonconsumptive, in-channel, recreation rights in the hands of non-state
entities were, and remain to a lesser degree, western water law heresy.
Recreational water rights are controlled by local governmental entities whose area economies are dependent upon boaters, and the
spectators that flock to these communities to watch special competitive
events. These communities are less vulnerable to state water politics,
and will call for their water in a dry year when enforcement of their
water right is truly needed.
The greatest threat to the water buffaloes was the sheer size of most
recreational in-channel diversions-claims that ranged up to 1800 cubic feet per second ("cfs").1 To them, it was irrelevant that none of the
water used for recreational purposes was consumed. To them, it was
irrelevant that agricultural diversions hold senior rights to nearly
ninety percent of the State's water,' while generating less than one percent of Colorado's gross product To them, it was immaterial that the
municipal diverters held senior rights to significant amounts of water,
and that it was primarily citizens of the large Front Range municipalities who traveled to and utilized the new boating parks. To them, it
was irrelevant that the Western Slope boating parks could function off
of flows that Colorado is already obligated to deliver at the State line to
meet its Colorado River Compact obligations. To them, it was irrele1. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Court, In re Application for Water Rights of Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 2
Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Decree, In re Chaffee County].
2. See COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE WATER
DEMANDS FACT SHEET 2, available at http://www.cwcb.state.co.us/IWMD/pdfdocs/Demand FactSheet 7-19-04.pdf [hereinafter CWCB FACT SHEET].
3. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NEWS RELEASE: GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) BY STATE, 2005 (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp state/gsp newsrelease.htm.
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vant that the tourist and recreation based industries are among the
State's largest and most important industries, and the largest industry
on the Western Slope. Rather, the traditionalists' primary concern
could be summed up in one word-control. The water buffaloes put
up a vigorous, yet ultimately unsuccessful, fight to stop what they believed to be a non-traditional use that they did not control.
To counter an unprecedented level of opposition, the proponents
engaged in a decade long effort between 1997 and 2006 to protect recreational water rights as a legitimate use of Colorado's water and ensure that such rights were not consigned to second-class status under
Colorado water law. As a result of a unique coalition of local governments, recreationalists and environmentalists, recognition of recreational water rights expanded from grudging acceptance of the ability
to appropriate just enough water for boat passage (55 cfs in the Ft.
Collins case),' to high flow decreed water rights of 1400 cfs in Steamboat and 1800 cfs in Chaffee County,5 and finally to statutory recognition in 2006 of the ability to appropriate as much as fifty percent of the
historic average volume in a river channel at a boating structure.6
This article begins with the application for recreation water rights
filed by the City of Golden in 1998. It turns next to the 2001 legislative
enactment of Senate Bill 216 during a break in the Golden trial. The
article then discusses the applications for boating parks by the towns of
Vail and Breckenridge, and the ultimate deadlock by the Colorado
Supreme Court in reviewing the CWCB's appeal of the Golden, Vail,
and Breckenridge decrees, thereby upholding the first large flows for
in-channel recreation uses. It then considers the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision in Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District v.
Colorado Water Conservation Board and the CWCB's rulemaking response. The article then discusses the State's all-out litigation stance
that occurred between 2003 and 2005 over the claim by the City of
Steamboat Springs, as well as the stipulated decree entered in the
claim by Chaffee County on behalf of the City of Salida and the Town
of Buena Vista. The article also considers the legislative response to
these various water court claims and decrees, including the attempt to
kill recreation rights with Senate Bill 62 in 2005, and the emergence of

4.

City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 919 (Colo. 1992) (en

banc).
5. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Court at 4, In
re Application of the City of Steamboat Springs, No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water
Div. 6 Mar. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Decree, In re Steamboat Springs]; Decree, In reChaffee County, supra note 1, at 4.
6. S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at COLO.

§ 37-92-305(13) (f)).
Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy

REV. STAT.

7.

Dist., 109 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2005).
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a compromise bill, Senate Bill 37, in 2006. Finally, it offers some observations and conclusions.
II. CREATING A FULL RECREATION WATER RIGHT: THE CITY
OF GOLDEN WHITE WATER COURSE (WATER DISION 1 CASE
NO. 98CW244)
A. BACKGROUND - THE 1;'T. COLLINS DECISION

In 1992, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized for the first time
an appropriative water right for in-channel use to support boating.! A
central issue in the case was whether the City of Fort Collins could
claim a water right for a boat chute built into an old diversion dam
(the "Power Dam") on the Cache La Poudre River.' In its final decision, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory definition of a diversion and held the boat chute constituted a diversion of water, and the
use of the diverted water for recreation by boaters and tubers constituted a beneficial use."° The court thus found the requirements of an
appropriation of water under Colorado law had been met, and granted
the City a water right decree to protect these uses."
The CWCB opposed the Fort Collins application. The court rejected the CWCB's argument that the claimed right was a statutory instream flow water right delegated to the CWCB's exclusive control."
Distinguishing the CWCB's instream flow rights, the court noted the
recreation right claimed by Fort Collins required a man-made diversion structure for the control of water to allow the intended beneficial

8. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d at 920, 933.
9. Id. at 920.
10. Id. at 932.
11. Id. at 933. Under Colorado water law, any person may gain a legally-protected
right to the use of water through the act of appropriation. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
Historically, appropriation was the act of diverting water from its channel that typically
manifested individual control of water. Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte
Ditch Co., 30 P. 1032, 1034 (Colo. 1892). Yet, Colorado courts long have recognized
that the method of controlling water to make possible its beneficial use is unimportant,
so long as it is reasonably efficient and accomplishes the beneficial purpose without
waste. Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 349 P.2d 370, 378 (Colo. 1960); Thomas v. Guiraud,
6 Colo. 530, 533 (Colo. 1883). The essential test of an appropriation is a demonstration that the water is, or will be, placed to a beneficial use. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 574 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
12. See City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d at 931. The Colorado General Assembly enacted
Senate Bill 97 in 1973.
This law authorized the CWCB to appropriate "minimum"
stream flows between designated points on a stream to "preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2006). It also removed statutory references to diversion in the definitions of "appropriation" and
"beneficial use." In 1987, the General Assembly made it clear only the CWCB is authorized to appropriate instream flows. S.B. 87-212, 56th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo.
1987) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)).
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use.'" Instream flow rights, on the other hand, do not require control
of the water by a man-made structure and instead represent minimum
flows for a stream reach, the purpose of which was not recreation but
to help preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree."
The court noted that an instream flow right usually signifies the complete absence of a man-made diversion or control structures and that
even in-channel diversion structures were inconsistent with the statutory instream flows.'"
B. THE GOLDEN BOATING PARK

The idea for a boating park on Clear Creek in Golden emerged
from citizen initiative, primarily from kayakers who wanted a place to
practice their skills in the Front Range metropolitan area, and who
were convinced that Clear Creek, as it exits the mountains and passes
through downtown Golden could be transformed into an exceptional
whitewater venue. Pushed by the kayakers, the City hosted a series of
public meetings at which the idea was thoroughly discussed. Initially
reluctant City officials were eventually convinced that not only was construction of the proposed park feasible, but that such a park would
attract large numbers of people to the downtown area and help spark a
much-needed revitalization.
The Golden City Council approved the construction of the boating
park with the intention of building a facility that would draw boaters
from around the Front Range of Colorado and would be capable of
hosting elite and Olympic-caliber events that would attract people from
around the country, and even around the world. Based on the input
received from kayakers, rafters and park supporters, and after considering historic flow data, Council directed the construction of a worldclass boating park.
The City hired Gary Lacy, a world-renowned course designer, expert engineer, and avid boater, to design the course. Mr. Lacy designed the course to operate optimally at a flow rate of 1000 cfs.'6 The
original course consisted of seven structures, using 4000 tons of rock
and 800 tons of grout or cement." The diversion dams were designed
and built to be natural in appearance, but at the same time were highly
engineered structures built eight feet down into the streambed and
fifteen feet into each stream bank.'8 The dams were built with low-flow
13. City ofFort Collins, 830 P.2d at 931.
14. COLO. REV.STAT. § 37-92-102(3).
15. City ofFort Collins, 830 P.2d at 931.
16. Testimony of Gary Lacy, Transcript of Record, In re Application for Water
Rights of the City of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Mar. 14.
2001) [hereinafter Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden].
17.

Id

18.

Id
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and high-flow boating channels or chutes to concentrate the water under different hydrologic conditions. The structures completely modified what had been a uniform stream channel. Spectator seating was
constructed adjacent to the course.
The enormous popularity of the initial boating park prompted City
Council to authorize construction of an "extension" that would
lengthen the course and add more features. Then, on December 30,
1998, the City filed for water rights to ensure there would be sufficient
flows in Clear Creek to protect the investment it had made in the boating park. 9 Just as important, the City sought to protect the significant
secondary economy that had grown around the boating park, and
which had already helped to revitalize the downtown, river-corridor
economy.
C. THE GOLDEN APPLICATION

Golden's application sought conditional and absolute water rights
for the diversion structures in the boating park. Golden asked for confirmation of absolute rights for a portion of the claimed flow rates for
the seven structures already built and in use on Clear Creek, ranging
from a high of 992 cfs to a low of 75 cfs, based on measured instantaneous peak flows at the closest gage during each month in 1998.0 The
City requested conditional rights for flow rates at the same structures
that varied by month, up to 1000 cfs in May, June and July. This was
based on the design capacity of the park and the hydrology of Clear
Creek. Golden also sought conditional water rights for the additional
structures it contemplated building in the boating park extension.
The application was specifically based on the statutory definition of
diversion at Colorado Revised Statutes ("C.R.S.") section 37-92-103(7),
as expressly interpreted in the Ft. Collins decision.'
D. THE WATER COURT PROCESS
Eight parties, including the CWCB, filed statements of opposition to
Golden's claim.' The State Engineer intervened in 2000.2' Golden
settled with all actual water users, but was unable to reach agreement
with the CWCB and the State and Division Engineers ("State"). With
19. Application for Water Rights of the City of Golden, In re Application for Water
Rights of the City of Golden, Case No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 June 13,

2001)
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Decree, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Golden, Case No.
98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. IJune 13, 2001) [hereinafter Decree, In reCityof
at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/watercourts/watGolden],
available
divl /ordergolden.htm.

23.

Id.
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no actual water rights that could be injured by the application, these
State entities pressed the case to trial to further their firm position that
in-channel water rights for recreation purposes could not be decreed
to the City under Colorado law. As one State witness explained, the
only acceptable term and condition ever offered by the State in settlement was that Golden withdraw the application. 4
In ruling on pretrial evidentiary motions, District CourtJudgeJonathan Hays noted the unique factual questions presented by Golden's
claim for an in-channel water right for its boating park. 5 His ruling
articulated the water court's view concerning the applicant's burden:
"Golden's burden is to establish that the flow rates it seeks do not exceed the reasonable rates needed to fulfill its stated purpose." 6 With
this road map from the court, Golden was able to prepare to meet its
burden at trial.
The State offered numerous grounds for opposing Golden's claim.
Among other theories, the State argued Golden's claims were in fact
instream flow water rights, and that only the CWCB was authorized to
appropriate water for instream flow purposes. Despite the clear holding in the Ft. Collins case, the State further argued Golden's whitewater
course structures did not constitute a "diversion" of water within the
statutory definition at C.R.S. section 37-92-103(7). Citing the definition of "beneficial use" at C.R.S. section 37-92-103(4), the State argued
that Golden could not demonstrate that the amount of water it
claimed was "that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made."'
While the State's grounds for opposition continually changed and
expanded, ultimately the State's main argument became that the court
should develop a "duty of water" for boating parks, limiting the size of
any water rights that could be claimed to only that which would allow
some minimally reasonable boating experience (i.e. just enough water
to float a boat). The State advanced this argument notwithstanding
Golden's undisputed intent to develop a "world-class" boating park.'
At the heart of the State's opposition, and underlying all of its arguments, was the State's assertion that recreation was a lesser or second24. Testimony of Edward Kowalski, Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden, supra
note 16.

25.

Orders Re: Applicant's Motions in Limine, In re Application for Water Rights of

the City of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Mar. 7,2001).

26.
27.

Id.
Colorado Water Conservation Board Statement of Opposition, In re Application

for Water Rights of the City of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Feb.

25, 1999).
28. Objectors' Trial Brief at 2-3, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of
Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Mar. 7, 2001).

29.

Id. at 3.
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class use of water that either should be denied or severely limited to
preserve the water for future, traditional consumptive uses.
In responding to the State's "duty of water" argument, Golden argued that no matter how the State dressed up the argument, its attempt to cap the size of Golden's recreation right to an amount less
than Golden's actual or intended beneficial use was contrary to the
right to appropriate the unappropriated waters of the State guaranteed
by Article XVI, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution.' Moreover, in
attempting to limit Golden's right to preserve water for some future,
undefined consumptive use, the State's argument amounted to a public trust-type argument in reverse.
The public trust doctrine has been used in some states to limit or
preclude proposed or existing water rights in order to ensure water is
left in the stream to protect certain future public uses of water without
water rights, such as recreation, boat passage and the environment.'
The irony in the Golden case was that the State was making this argument so that future water appropriators could further deplete (not
protect) the stream. Golden pointed out that Colorado courts had
repeatedly rejected the public trust doctrine when it came to setting
aside water for environmental benefits, and argued that the doctrine
could not now be invoked to preclude a water right for a demonstrated, current beneficial use in favor of hypothetical future appropriations.

Golden cited Board of County Commissioners v. United States,

for the proposition that "a public interest theory is in conflict with the
doctrine of prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the
absence of statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriation based
on public policy."" It was almost worth the fight just to see the water
buffaloes have to defend a public trust doctrine they have fought so
vigorously against in the past.
In its trial brief, Golden cited the diversion statute, C.R.S. section
37-92-103(7), the Ft. Collins decision, and other Colorado Supreme
Court cases for the proposition that a diversion in the conventional
sense, meaning removing water and carrying it away from the stream,

30. City of Golden Reply Brief, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of
Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 March 7, 2001).
31. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 719 (Cal. 1983);
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094-95
(Idaho 1984); Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-71
(Mont. 1984).
32. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995) (en
banc); see also Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901
P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) ("This court has never recognized the public
trust doctrine with respect to water.") (Mullarkey, J., dissenting); People v. Emmert,
597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (rejecting the public trust doctrine as a
basis for recognizing public recreational use of water over privately owned stream beds
of non-navigable waterways).
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was never a strict requirement of prior appropriation law in Colorado."
On the "beneficial use" question, Golden pointed out that the term was
not defined in the Colorado Constitution. Case law was very clear that
what constitutes beneficial use is a question of fact and depends upon
the circumstances in each case. ' Golden spent considerable time at
trial proving the economic value of recreational uses of water, a value
that vastly exceeded the economic value of most agricultural water
uses. Agriculture accounts for about ninety percent of all water consumption in Colorado.' Golden's recreation use, by contrast, creates
enormous economic value without consuming a drop of water. All of
the water used in the course would be immediately available for use
and re-use downstream of the kayak park.
With its opening argument at the water court trial, Golden suggested that if it had built a hydropower project on the banks of Clear
Creek and sought a 1000 cfs flow rate, the State would not have filed its
opposition.' Golden noted there were only two differences between its
boating park water right and a more "traditional" hydropower right.
First, the recreation rights would not dewater the stream. Second, the
kayak course generated more revenue for the City than a hydropower
plant. Testifying on behalf of Golden, Dr. Robert Raucher conserva-

33. City of Golden Trial Brief, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of
Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 March 7, 2001); see also Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 573-574
(Colo. 1979) (en banc) (recognizing that Colorado permits "valid appropriation without a headgate or ditch"); Genoa v. Westfall, 349 P.2d 370, 378 (Colo. 1960) ("It is not
necessary in every case for an appropriator of water to construct ditches or artificial
ways through which the water might be taken from the stream in order that a valid
appropriation be made."); Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. Luthe, 9 P. 794, 796 (Colo.
1886) ("We think there may be a constitutional appropriation of water without its being at the instant taken from the bed of the stream."); Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 531,
533 (Colo. 1883) ("The true test of an appropriation is the successful application
thereof to the beneficial use designed; and the method of diverting or carrying the
same, or making such application, is immaterial."). Other Western states have similarly
recognized that the diversion element in prior appropriation law is better understood
as requiring a degree of control over the water claimed sufficient to affect the desired
beneficial use, rather than actual removal of the water from the stream. See State Dep't
of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928 (Idaho 1974) ("[O]ur
Constitution does not require actual physical diversion."); Stevenson v. Steele, 453 P.2d
819, 826 (Idaho 1969) (finding appropriation for instream livestock use); Steptoe Live
Stock Co. v. Gulley, 295 P. 772, 774-75 (Nev. 1931) (mechanical means of diversion
from the stream not necessary for a livestock diversion).
34. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Sw. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294, 1322
(Colo. 1982) (en banc) (quoting City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 842
(Colo. 1939)).
35. CWCB FACr SHEET, supranote 2.
36. Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden, supra note 16, at 16 (3-12-01).
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tively estimated the present and future value of Golden's whitewater
course to be $23 million. 7
On the issue of intent, Golden's Director of Public Utilities, Dan
Hartman, testified that the City wanted to develop a "world-class" facility to draw people into the area, revitalize the downtown, and maximize the economic benefits to the City.' Gary Lacy, the designer of
the course and an expert engineer and kayaker, explained the structures in the boating park, their function and hydraulics, and their optimum design capacity of 1000 cfs. 9 Various business owners testified
about the importance of the boating park to the local economy. Dr.
Jeris Danielson, the former State Engineer, further explained how the
structures controlled the amount of water claimed, and offered his
expert opinion that Golden's water rights were administrable by the
State Engineer's Office and that Golden's claim met the requirements
of a traditional Colorado water right appropriation.'
The State based a great deal of its opposition to the Golden claim
on the testimony of its outside "boating expert," Dr. Bo Shelby, a sociologist from Oregon with experience in quantifying the needs of boaters in the context of decisions about dam and hydropower operations.
Dr. Shelby supervised a survey of boaters that had used the Golden
boating park, and offered his opinion that the Golden claim was excessive."'
While seriously questioning the value of the opinion testimony the
State's outside expert offered, Golden did not object to the raw data he
had collected in the surveys on course use. In fact, the survey information was ultimately helpful to the court in determining the extent of
beneficial use. The survey demonstrated that the boating park was
beneficially used at flows of 1000 cfs and greater, and was extensively
used throughout the year. Among other findings, the State's collected
data showed the mean user in the sample had used the course 100
times, and traveled 47 miles from home to get there." The survey also
demonstrated that many kayakers had used, or would like to use the
boating park at night. One survey respondent commented that the
Golden boating park was "among the best courses anywhere."43 An37.

Id at 181 (3-13-01). The analysis upon which Dr. Raucher based his testimony is

found in

RAusCHER ET AL., PRELIMINARY EvALUATION OF THE BENEFICIAL VALUE OF
WATERS DIVERTED IN THE CLEAR CREEK WHITEWATER PARK IN THE CITY OF GOLDEN (Dec.

7,2000).
38. Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden, supranote 16, at 61 (3-12-01).
39. Id. at 146.
40. Id. at 12-37 (3-14-06).
41. Id. at 93 (3-15-06). A subsequent Colorado Open Records Act request, on file
with author, revealed that the CWCB paid Dr. Shelby $80,000 for his work in opposing
the Golden claim at a rate of $385 per hour.
42. Transcript of Record, In reCity of Golden, supranote 16.
43. Id. at 129.
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other" said, "If there were lights, there would be folks there all night
long. 44

E. BREAK IN THE GOLDEN TRIAL AND ATTEMPTED EMERGENCY
LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE

The first phase of the trial ended on March 15, 2001. At that time,
it was scheduled to continue for one additional day on May 10, 2001. 45
During this break in the trial, the CWCB drafted a bill that became
Senate Bill 216, regarding what have come to be called "recreational
in-channel diversions" ("RICDs"). Ordinarily, bills cannot be introduced into the Colorado General Assembly at such a late point in the
legislative session. Nevertheless, SB 216 gained late-bill status from
legislators sympathetic to the CWCB's traditional view of water rights.
As originally proposed by the CWCB, the bill would have given the
CWCB almost complete authority to decide RICD applications, subject
to water court review only under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.' The bill would have applied retroactively to Golden's application even though it was filed in 1998 and the trial on the application
was almost complete. In short, it was originally an effort to severely
limit or outright kill RICDs. At best, it was an effort to make RICDs a
second-class water right. As discussed in Section III below, the bill that
finally emerged was much modified, and, after a thorough legislative
battle, essentially ratified RICDs as a beneficial use of Colorado water.
F. THE WATER COURT DECISION
Upon completion of the trial, the water court decreed the full
amount of the water rights claimed by Golden."7 In doing so, the court
pointed out the boating park was used both day and night, and found
44. Id. at 130-31.
45. Id. at 221.
46. S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., at 7 11.22-25 (Colo. 2001) (preamended
draft 2, Apr. 24, 2001) (noting that the water judge shall utilize the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth in COLo REv. STAT. § 24-4-106(6), (7)). The arbitrary and
capricious standard gives great deference to the agency decision under review. The
CWCB argued in Colorado Water ConservationBoard v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District that its findings and recommendations should be reviewed using this
higher standard. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument:
By urging a higher standard such as clear and convincing evidence or arbitrary and capricious review, the CWCB is fashioning for itself the role of an
administrative adjudicatory agency or a quasi-judicial body-a role which...
was specifically rejected by the General Assembly. SB 216 does not grant the
CWCB the authority to review RICD applications as an administrative adjudicatory agency or quasi-judicial body, and thus, its findings are not entitled to a
corresponding deferential standard.
109 P.3d 585, 597 (Colo. 2005).
47. Decree, In re City of Golden, supra note 22.
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Golden was entitled to absolute rights for the flow rates as measured at
the Clear Creek Gauge for the time periods when the course had been
used by boaters as of the time of trial, and granted conditional rights
for the full claimed remaining amounts, including the 1000 cfs highflow claim."
The court held that the seven structures that had been built at the
time of trial controlled water within the statutory meaning of the term
"diversion" in C.R.S. section 37-92-103(7), and as the diversion requirement had been further explained in the Ft. Collins decision.49 The
court found the structures were designed for optimal effect at 1000 cfs,
and that, at this flow, the structures created waves and jets of water,
self-scouring pools, hydraulic holes, large changes in current direction,
and other whitewater features important to boaters!"
The court offered a detailed finding explaining that the full
claimed amounts had or could be put to beneficial use. Most importantly, the court found that the boating park received greater use, and
Golden received greater economic benefit, as the flows increased, so
that the greatest use and greatest economic benefit were at the high
flow rate of 1000 cfs:
The Court further finds that this beneficial use at the conditional
amount claimed is reasonable and there is no waste as the higher the
flows, the greater the Course usage, and attendant economic benefit.
The testimony was unrebutted that when flows are at the 1000 cfs
level, the Course is accessible to intermediate, advanced-intermediate,
expert, and even world-class boaters. Intermediates use easier parts of
the Course, while more experienced boaters utilize more challenging
structures in the Course.
In addition, the Court finds that the Golden Course is perceived by
many boaters as the best in the area. That reputation translates directly into economic value for the City in that it attracts boaters from
across the State, the Country, and even international competitors.
The Court finds that the reputation of the Course is in large part due
to the high flows.
The Court concludes that high flow rates are a critical component of
the Course as an attraction and amenity for Golden. For all of the
foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that flows of up to 1,000 cfs
can and will be put to beneficial use and not wasted."
The court expressly found Golden's appropriations to be reasonable for the purposes for which they were claimed, and rejected the
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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CWCB's attempt to set aside water for future consumptive uses. Citing
the statutory definition of "beneficial use" at C.R.S. section 37-92103 (4), the court explained:
The question, therefore, is not whether the amount of water claimed
is "reasonable" in the abstract, or as compared to other potential future uses of the water, but whether the amount claimed is reasonable
for the purposes for which Golden made the appropriation. When
tested against Golden's purposes .

.

. the Court concludes that the

1,000 cfs claimed by Golden in May, June and July, and the lesser
5"
amounts claimed in the other months of the year, are reasonable.
On this point, the court specifically noted: "Golden's constitutional
right to appropriate a new water right in accordance with Colorado law
may not be denied or limited based upon the public trust doctrine, or
similar policy restraints purportedly rooted in concern for the quanti53
'
ties that should be left for future water users.
In further assessing the reasonableness of Golden's claim, the court
referenced Golden's stipulations with all actual water users on Clear
Creek. 4 The court explained that Golden was adding a new use onto
water that was already mostly subject to downstream senior calls, so that
in a dry year, 100% of the claimed water was already subject to a call; in
an average year, roughly eighty-four percent of the water that would
pass through the structures was already subject to a downstream senior
call. "
In perhaps the most stunning rebuke of the State's case, the court
offered a detailed finding discounting the testimony of the State's $385
per hour boating expert:
The Court further finds that the testimony of the State's expert witness, Dr. Bo Shelby, does not assist the Court in rendering the decision on "beneficial use" and "reasonableness" that must be made in
the context of the Colorado appropriation doctrine. Water rights in
Colorado are quantified according to the amount of water that is reasonable to serve the appropriator's intended beneficial use. Dr.
Shelby did not take into account the intent of the appropriator, the
City of Golden. On this point, Dr. Shelby did not consider one of the
major elements of his own methodology; namely, the decision envi52. Id.
53. Id. ("[A] public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the absence of statutory authority, deny a
legitimate appropriation based on public policy." (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995))).
54. Several of the stipulations were designed to work in tandem with the boating
park so that the timing of upstream diversions would impact flow levels in the boating
park only at night, and thus not affect day-time boating. See Decree, In re City of
Golden, supra note 22.
55. Id.
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ronment, which in this instance is the law in Colorado on the appropriation of water. Instead, his opinions were based on a survey of a
small group of Course users. The survey results purportedly offered
the flow numbers that kayakers prefer for different boating opportunities, but the Court notes that those numbers are inconsistent with
the kayakers' narrative comments about the Course, which expressed
a clear preference for higher flows.56
The court further found that Golden's boating park water right
would have no impact on Colorado's ability to fully use its compact
entitlement:
Because the rights sought in this matter are on Clear Creek in
Golden, immediately upstream of major industrial, municipal and agricultural diversions of area in-state water users, it will not negatively
impact Colorado's ability to use its compact entitlements. The unrebutted testimony of the former State Engineer, Dr. Danielson, established that the water diverted by the Course . . . will be beneficially
used and reused by downstream appropriators up to seven times before it reaches the Colorado-Nebraska state line. The State conceded
at trial that there is no adverse impact
on Colorado's compact enti7
tlement as a result of this water right.
The court entered its decree on June 13, 2001, awarding 8Golden
the full amounts of the absolute and conditional flows claimed.
G. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GOLDEN DECREE
The Golden case expanded previous notions of what a recreational
water right could be. It took the legal precedent provided in the Ft.
Collins decision and developed it into a full-fledged appropriative water
right. In place of the notch in the dam that was addressed in the Ft.
Collins case, Golden's appropriation involved a series of specially designed instream structures, engineered to generate particular whitewater features favored by boaters at high rates of flow. In effect, each of
these structures functioned like a dam, controlling and shaping water
flows in the manner desired for the intended boating uses. Rather
than a minimum appropriation for safe boat passage, Golden requested and obtained an appropriation consistent with operation of a
"world class" boating park. While nonconsumptive, the decreed flows
56. Id.
57. Id. Notwithstanding this concession in the Golden and other RICD cases, the
State continued to maintain compact impairment as one of the principal justifications
for SB 216. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., RICD STATEMENT OF BAsIS AND PURPOSE 1
[hereinafter CWCB, RICD STATEMENT OF BAsis AND PURPOSE], available at
http: / /www.cwcb.state.co.us /WaterSupply/RICD/Rules/RICDstatementofbasisandpur
pose.pdeo
58. Decree, In re City of Golden, supra note 22.
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represented most of the hydrograph available in that reach of Clear
Creek. The case established the fundamental principle that the reasonableness of the flow rates claimed for a boating park depends on
the intent of the appropriator-the kind of recreation and boating
experience the appropriator intended to establish with its boating
park. In this respect, the water court simply confirmed that recreation
water rights should be treated like other water rights under the Colorado appropriation doctrine."
The case stirred widespread opposition among traditional water interests. Used to viewing the prior appropriation doctrine as the special
purview of those whose water uses required removal of water from a
stream channel, as well as water consumption, these interests fiercely
resisted this new form of in-channel appropriation. Yet, in one of the
great ironies of the entire battle over recreational in-channel diversions, the Golden application triggered a legislative initiative that initially sought to legislate such rights out of existence, but instead, ultimately served to confirm and bolster the legal foundation for such
rights.
II. SENATE BILL 216
At the aforementioned March 2001 break in the Golden trial, and
perhaps anticipating that it would lose, the CWCB persuaded Senator
Lewis Entz and Representative Lois Spradley to introduce a late bill
"Concerning the Establishment of a Procedure for the Adjudication of
a Recreational In-Channel Diversion by a Local Government. " ' As
originally written, the bill ("SB 216") would have given the CWCB substantial authority over RICDs. The applicant was to provide the CWCB
a copy of its application prior to its filing with the water court.6 ' The
CWCB was to review the application and make an administrative finding whether or not to grant the application." Water court consideration of any RICD claim was then limited to review on the administrative
record, under an arbitrary and capricious standard." The bill would
have applied retroactively to all pending RICD applications.' In short,
the State agency opposing the Golden recreational water right applica59.

For example, the appropriator for an agricultural right decides whether to

irrigate 10 acres or 1000 acres. So long as the water can be put to beneficial use without waste, the appropriator has been allowed to make that decision. For boating parks,

like other beneficial uses of water, it was shown in the Golden case that the beneficial
use increases with increased flows at least up to the design capacity of the course.
60. S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2001) (preamended draft 1, Apr.
24, 2001), available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/2001/inetcbill.nsf/fsbillcont/
1B78415825BD448687256A24006AEB20?Open&file--216PPP O1.pdf.

61.
62.

Id. at 311. 1-16.
Id. at 3 11.9-12.

63.

Id. at 4 11.10-12, 7 11.3-6.

64.

Id. at 4 11.15-18.
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tion in court would have been given almost complete authority to decide that Golden's claim should be denied.
As substantially revised in the legislative process, the role of the
CWCB was altered so that it became simply a fact-finder for the water
court. The final bill also limited the class of entities that could hold
these rights to local governments (county, municipality, city and
county, water district, water and sanitation district, water conservation
district, or water conservancy district).' Factors to be considered in
the CWCB review process were identified as: (1) potential impairment
of Colorado's ability to consumptively use its compact entitlements; (2)
the appropriateness of the proposed stream reach; (3) whether there is
access for the proposed use; (4) whether the proposed diversion would
injure instream flow water rights; and (5) whether the proposed diversion would promote maximum utilization of the waters of the state.'
Under the final bill, the CWCB is to make a recommendation to the
water court concerning whether to grant, grant with conditions, or
deny the application based on written findings.67 The CWCB findings
were presumptively correct in water court, subject to rebuttal.' The
bill defined "recreational in-channel diversion" as "the minimum
stream flow as it is diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial use between specific points defined by physical control structures
... for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water."' Applications filed prior to January 1, 2001 were exempted from the provisions of the bill, thus "grandfathering" the Golden, Breckenridge, and
Vail claims from the new legislation, and allowing these cases to be
tried under pre-SB 216 water rights law. 0
Far from being a repudiation of the Ft. Collins case, SB 216 as
amended in the legislative process became a codification of that decision. The Legislative Statement for SB 216 explained:
SB 216 is designed to ensure that decrees for recreational in-channel
diversions, as recognized by the Colorado Supreme Court in the City
of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins case, are integrated into the state
prior appropriations system in a manner which appropriately balances the need for water based recreational opportunities with the
ability of Colorado citizens to divert and store water under our com-

65.

S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., § 2 (Colo. 2001) (codified at COLO. REV.
§ 37-92-103(7) (2006)).
66. S.B. 01-216, § 1 (codified at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(6) (b) (I)-(VI)).
67. S.B. 01-216, § 1 (codified at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(6) (b)).

STAT.

68.

69.
70.

S.B. 01-216, § 3 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(13) (a)).
S.B. 01-216, § 2 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.3))
S.B. 01-216, § 1 (codified at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(6) (d)).
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pact entitlements for more traditional consumptive use purposes,
such as municipal, industrial and agricultural uses.71
The Legislative Statement further provided: "Finally, nothing in
S.B. 216 is intended to create a water right which did not previously
exist by virtue of state Supreme Court interpretation of Colorado statute. . . .7 Clearly, and despite arguments that would come in later
RICD litigation, SB 216 did not create new water rights. All of the case
law on recreational in-channel diversions developed prior to SB 216
remains relevant even after the statute.
In another irony of this water battle, legislative icon Lewis Entz
would lose his bid for reelection in 2006, in large measure due to his
opposition to recreation water rights. His district included areas of the
State in which recreation, including water-based activities, are an increasingly important part of the economy. Those areas overwhelmingly voted against his reelection.
IV. STATE APPEAL OF THE GOLDEN DECISION TO THE
COLORADO SUPREME COURT
The State Engineer and the CWCB filed their appeal of the Golden
case with the Colorado Supreme Court in 2001. The importance of
this case is demonstrated by the number of parties filing amicus briefs:
forty six in total, roughly evenly split between support for Golden and
support for the State.
A. MOTION TO DISQUALIFYJUSTICE HOBBS
In preparing for the Supreme Court, attorneys for Golden faced a
difficult question: what to do about the participation of one of the
members of the Court, Justice Gregory Hobbs. Until his appointment
to the bench in 1996, Justice Hobbs served as general counsel to the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Northern District"),
and his former law firm continued as its legal counsel. He represented
the Northern District in its opposition to the City of Fort Collins' filing
for recreation water rights.' In the Golden appeal, the Northern District filed an extensive "amicus" brief with the Supreme Court in support of the CWCB. 74 The CWCB's opening brief in the Supreme Court,
and a number of the amicus briefs filed in support of the CWCB's posi-

71. Legislative Statement, S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2001)
(emphasis added) (on file with author).
72. Id.
73. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 919 (Colo. 1992) (en

banc).
74. See Brief for Amici Curiae Colo. Springs Utils. et al., State Eng'r v. City of
Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252), 2002 WL 32357112.
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tion, contained substantially the same arguments made by Justice
Hobbs in a brief written in opposition to the Fort Collins' application.
Eric Wilkinson, general manager of the Northern District, also served
as a member of the CWCB board and had produced a briefing paper
for the board expressing considerable skepticism about recreation water rights." Despite these red flags, it was not easy for Golden to ask a
well-respected Supreme CourtJustice to disqualify himself.
There were intense discussions among Golden and all of the
amicus parties supporting its position, as well as consultation with formerjustices regarding whether a motion to disqualify should be filed.
Opinion was equally divided. Many expressed concern over the effect
it might have on future cases that they would have before the Colorado
Supreme Court. In the end, however, it came down to what was in the
best interests of the client, the City of Golden. When analyzed on that
basis, the decision was clear. Golden filed a motion to disqualify Justice Hobbs."6 Although the Supreme Court denied the motion, Justice
Hobbs voluntarily recused himself after the motion was filed.77 Justice
Hobbs' nonparticipation would turn out to be a critical moment in the
RICD story, as the quest for large in-channel recreation water rights
may have been cut short by a Supreme Court loss at such an early stage
of the movement.
B. THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT
In its Opening Brief in the Supreme Court, the State distilled its
trial court arguments and pushed three main theories. First, it argued
that Golden's water right was an impermissible instream flow, and that
recreation was only a recognized beneficial use of water in Colorado
when it occurs at an impounded dam." Second, the State argued the
structures in the Golden course did not sufficiently control the flows so
as to constitute a statutory "diversion" of the type recognized in the Ft.
Collins decision.' Third, the State asserted Golden's appropriation was
unreasonable, and could not meet the statutory definition of beneficial
use at C.R.S. section 37-92-103(4).80 Underlying all these arguments,
however, and apparent in all the briefing, was the State's sentiment
that the water Golden sought needed to be saved for other consump75. Eric W. Wilkinson, Briefing Paper to Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreational Instream Flows: Questions, Concerns, and Statutory Considerations (Oct. 23,
2000).
76. See Notice of Non-Participation, State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027
(Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252).
77. Id.
78. Opening Brief for State of Colorado at 4-13, State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69
P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252).
79. Id. at 14-17.
80. Id. at 21-28.
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tive uses. While this viewpoint was implicit in the State's arguments on
appeal,8' it was explicit in many of the amici briefs, which claimed recreational appropriations would "deprive the citizens of the state of
Colorado of their right . . . to divert unappropriated water,"8 and
would impact "the ability of water users in Colorado to develop waters
of the state."" Since any existing water right (absolute or conditional)
would already be senior to the Golden course, the argument was that
Golden's current beneficial use should be curtailed to save water for
future, undefined uses, which these entities believed were more important.
On its instream flow argument, the State referenced legislative history related to the State's instream flow program, emphasizing its concern about appropriations of water not based on out-of-channel diversion and control of the water. In particular, it argued the enactment of
Senate Bill 212 in 1987, which established the CWCB's exclusive authority to appropriate instream flows, was a legislative repudiation of
the Ft. Collins decision, and barred Golden's in-channel diversion water right. "4 After SB 212, the State argued, in-channel recreation rights
could not be claimed by any entity other than the CWCB, and the only
recreation right that could be claimed by entities other than the CWCB
was for water that was physically diverted out-of-channel or stored in an
85
on-channel reservoir.
To support its argument that the Golden structures did not "divert"
the amount of water claimed, the State emphasized the difference between the dam and notch at issue in Ft. Collins and the different kind
of control over the water exhibited by the diversion structures in the
Golden boating park. 8 The Golden structures, the State asserted,
merely created whitewater features, whereas the notch in the dam in
Fort Collins had impounded water and then allowed safe boat passage. 7 The State argued that the Ft. Collins decision presented a limited exception to what the State asserted was a strict requirement in
Colorado law that water right could only be created for water diverted
81.

This view was clear in the State's original expert report by Dr. Shelby, who pro-

posed a "percentage approach" whereby Golden would get eighty-six percent of the
available water instead of a water right for a fixed appropriation. The basis for this
novel concept was to leave "14% of the flow in the river ... for other [future] uses." At
trial, the State prevented a detailed cross-examination of Dr. Shelby on this approach
by agreeing to delete portions of the report from the record already in evidence. See
Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden, supranote 16, at 160-63 (3-15-01).

82.

Brief for Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist. et al. as Amici Curiae Support-

ing Appellants at 21, State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003) (No.
01SA252).
83. Brief for Amici Curiae Colo. Springs Utils. et al., supra note 74, at 2.
84. Opening Brief for State of Colorado, supra note 78, at 10-11.

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 14-15.
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out-of-channel, and urged the Supreme Court to narrowly limit the
holding in Ft. Collins to the facts of that case. 88 Moreover, the State argued that the Golden structures exhibited the requisite control only at
a 30 cfs low-flow level, the flow rate at which water was contained within
a low-flow conveyance notch in the structures. If Golden's right was
allowed at all, "the water court should have granted a maximum right
of 30 cfs."' In the alternative, the State argued that at the very most,
the claim must be limited to 200 cfs, the flow rate at which the structures began to create white water features.'
Finally, the State argued Golden's appropriation was not a reasonable use of water and that either the 30 cfs at which a low flow conveyance channel is created or the 200 cfs at which whitewater features are
created would better meet the statutory definition of "beneficial use."9
The State maintained that the decreed appropriation constituted "virtually the entire hydrograph and all of the water produced in the upper Clear Creek basin. 92 Thus, the court should have established a
"duty of water" for recreational boating that would limit appropriations
to a boat passage flow, not the amount necessary to meet the appropriator's intended experience.
C.

GOLDEN'S RESPONSE

Responding to the State's arguments, Golden emphasized the water court's findings respecting Golden's intent to build a world-class
whitewater course, that the course was designed to operate at the decreed flow rate of 1000 cfs, that the course structures controlled water
and created desired whitewater features at this rate of flow, and that
this amount of water is available for appropriation." Golden emphasized it was merely exercising its constitutional right to appropriate the
waters of the state for beneficial use and that it was doing so fully
within the requirements of Colorado water law."4 Golden argued its inchannel structures met all statutory and case-law requirements of a

88.
See id. at 14-20; see also Reply Brief for State of Colorado at 16-17, State Eng'r v.
City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252). On this point, the CWCB's
argument in the Supreme Court directly contradicted the White Paper it circulated in
support of SB 216, which argued that the Ft. Collins decision was a very broad holding
that needed to be limited by legislation. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreation

Water Rights Legislation (Jan. 2001).
89. Opening Brief for State of Colorado, supra note 78, at 3.
90. Id. at 3-4.

91.

Id. at 26.

92.
93.

Id.
See City of Golden Answer Brief, State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027

(Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252).

94.

Id. at 6.
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diversion, and that the test of control established in the Ft. Collins decision had been met.95
Responding to State arguments concerning the relevance of SB
212, which gave the CWCB exclusive authority to appropriate instream
flows, Golden pointed out it was not seeking an instream flow right. It
noted Fort Collins had originally filed for an instream flow right but
had amended its application to claim an appropriation based on diversion at dams that controlled water for beneficial use.'
Regarding beneficial use and reasonableness, Golden pointed to
the clear evidence of the economic benefits of the course to the City
and the undisputed evidence linking the extent of flows to the extent
of use.97 Golden intended to build an elite course, one that would attract boaters from not only the entire Front Range of Colorado but
nationally and even internationally for special events. Viewed from this
perspective, the claimed level of flows was reasonable.
Golden also argued the claimed flows were reasonable in the context of Clear Creek, its hydrology, and the existing pattern of water
uses.' Not only were claimed flows physically available, Golden's analysis determined that virtually all this water would be flowing downstream to meet senior rights anyway. Golden highlighted the trial
court finding that in dry years, 100% of the water would be subject to
downstream senior calls.' Golden also noted the stipulations it had
entered with all actual water users."
Golden argued the fallacy of the State's diversion and control argument was demonstrated by the fact that it would have been overcome if Golden had simply constructed a parallel kayak course channel
next to the stream, and then diverted up to 1000 cfs of the river into
that channel.'"' Although that approach would be wasteful in terms of
land use and finances, and would unnecessarily degrade the environment, it would have completely addressed the State's control argument. Rather than go to such unnecessary extremes, Golden followed
the express language of C.R.S. section 37-92-103(7), and the Ft. Collins
decision, and built the structures in the channel. In turn, those dams
controlled the water in a manner that created one of the best kayak
courses in the country, all without de-watering the stream or harming
the environment.

95.

Id. at 14.

96.

Id. at 16; see also City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 920-21

(Colo. 1992) (en banc).
97.

City of Golden Answer Brief, supranote 93, at 25.

98.

Id.

99.

Id. at 27.

100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 20.
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Finally, Golden noted the passage of SB 216 rendered moot the
State's various policy-based arguments. 2 Golden argued that the
Court should not consider the far-flung scenarios regarding future
kayak courses at unknown locations and with unknown circumstances
that were raised by the State and its supporting amici" The General
Assembly had already considered the same scenarios and policy arguments when it passed SB 216. With that bill, the General Assembly
acknowledged the validity of RICD water rights while imposing some
additional factors for the water court to consider, as well as creating an
advisory role for the CWCB. So, while Golden and the other three applications pending at the time of SB 216 were exempted from the legislation, the legislature had already taken up the issue, considered the
policy questions, and provided guidance for all future claims. There
was no need for the Supreme Court to second-guess what the legislature had just done with SB 216.
D. ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

The case was argued on October 2, 2002. The Supreme Court was
standing-room-only, and even the standing room was fully occupied
along both walls of the spectator section. More than 200 people
somehow managed to find seats. Arrayed in the front row were the
State's top water officials, including the executive director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources, the State Engineer, and the
director of the CWCB. For Golden, most of the City Council was present, as were representatives of the Northwest Council of Governments,
many other Colorado cities and towns, Trout Unlimited, and representatives of the recreation and environmental communities.
Golden's presentation began with the observation that the underlying premise of the State's appeal was that recreation is a lesser form of
water use and that limits should be placed on recreation water uses
that are not placed on other types of water uses. Golden noted that
the water court had rejected that premise, and urged the Supreme
Court to do the same. Golden's basic argument was that recreation is
an acknowledged beneficial use of water under Colorado water law,
and that there was no basis for treating this beneficial use any differently than any other type of water right appropriation. It urged the
court to explicitly acknowledge that recreation is a use of water coequal with any other beneficial use.
Golden argued its water right met the same requirements as any
other water right: diversion pursuant to statute, beneficial use at
102. Id. at 41.
103. Id. One such scenario was that Las Vegas would throw a few rocks in the Colorado River at Fruita and claim large flows of water to preclude its upstream consumptive use.
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amounts claimed, and amounts claimed are reasonable. It repeated
again the weight of supporting evidence for each of these elements at
trial and affirmed by the water court in its decision. It urged the court
to reject the State's attempt to assert authority not found in law to reduce appropriations for the benefit of undetermined future appropriations.
Golden pointed to the demonstrated economic benefits generated
by the use, by the wide range of users who enjoy the whitewater course,
by the use of the course for elite competitions, by the widespread recognition of the course as one of the best in the country, and by the
water court's finding that there was no waste associated with the use.
Golden emphasized the importance of considering the appropriator's
intent when evaluating reasonableness, and pointed to the City's welldocumented desire to have a world-class facility.
Golden then turned to the matter of diversion and control and
pointed out previous Supreme Court decisions rejecting the State's
theory that water must be diverted out of the channel. Golden noted
the abundant evidence at trial establishing the highly engineered nature of the structures, their design to work best at 1000 cfs, and their
effectiveness at creating features that produced the desired recreation
experience. The best evidence of all, Golden argued, was the thousands of documented users who had been coming to the course with
their boats and the many others who had been watching and enjoying
these uses. Crowds of people don't come to a river to watch it flow in
its normal channel.
To counter the State's claim that Golden should be limited to the
minimum amount to float a boat, Golden pointed out that people do
not come to Colorado to ski our minimum slopes, to climb our minimum-sized mountains, or to experience the State's minimum beauty.
Cities are not limited to irrigating minimum-size parks or lawns, and
farmers are not restricted to growing the least-consuming crops. Likewise, Golden did not build a minimum whitewater course, nor was it
required to. Colorado water law encourages users to be efficient, but
efficiency is framed by the context of the desired beneficial use. Colorado leaves the matter of that use to the appropriator to determine,
not state agencies.
On March 14, 2003, the Clerk of the Supreme Court notified the
parties that the Justices had determined not to reach a decision until
after they heard oral arguments in the State's appeal of water right
decrees issued by the District Court for Water Division No. 5 for the
boating parks in Vail and Breckenridge.
V. EXTENDING THE RECREATION WATER RIGHT: VAIL AND
BRECKENRIDGE
As the Golden case progressed, other Colorado towns and cities
explored the possibility of claiming water rights for their river im-
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provements. They saw the opportunity to help diversify and strengthen
their economies while providing an increasingly popular amenity for
their citizens. After Golden, the next communities to commit to securing water rights for their whitewater parks were the mountain towns of
Vail and Breckenridge.' °'
A. THE VAIL WHITEWATER PARK AND WATER COURT APPLICATION
(WATER DIVISION 5, CASE No. 00CW259)
Vail is a world-famous ski destination that has increasingly sought
ways to attract visitors year round. Among its many natural amenities is
Gore Creek as it moves through the heart of the town. Vail's local
boating community and its tourism board made a presentation to
Vail's Town Council about the importance of kayaking to the state's
economy and asked the Town to consider building a whitewater park.
After further study, the Council voted to construct a whitewater park
within the channel in the heart of Vail's Gore Creek Promenade pedestrian area. In its first summer of operation, the park hosted the
Teva Whitewater Festival, which was broadcast nationwide on Fox
Sports Net and brought thousands of visitors to Vail during the spring
season.
On December 26, 2000, the municipal water provider for Vail, the
Eagle River Water & Sanitation District ("District"), filed an application
for conditional water rights for the Town of Vail Whitewater Park. ' By
Memorandum of Understanding dated November 16, 2000, the Town
of Vail and the District had agreed to the manner in which the proposed whitewater park would be operated in relation to area municipal
and snowmaking water rights, and the District agreed to adjudicate
and own the water rights for the boating park.'" As beneficial uses, the
District identified boating (including kayaking, rafting and canoeing),
piscatorial, and general recreational uses.0 7 Objections were filed by
the CWCB, the State and Division Engineers, the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, and the Cities of Colorado Springs and
Aurora through the Homestake Project.'0 Trout Unlimited filed a
104. Aspen also filed a claim in 2000 for water rights for its new boating course. The
decree established an absolute right for 270 cfs in June, 350 cfs in July, and 33 cfs in
August in the channel of the Roaring Fork in which the course was constructed. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree, In re Application for Water
Rights of the Town of Aspen, No. 00CW284 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5 Aug. 11,

2005).
105. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Water Court at 1, 4,
In re Application for Water Rights of the Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist., No.
O0CW259 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5 June 5, 2002) [hereinafter Decree, In re Eagle

River].
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2.
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supporting statement so that it would have standing to participate in
the case."
B. TOWN OF BRECKENRIDGE WHITEWATER PARK AND WATER COURT
APPLICATION (WATER DIVISION 5, CASE No. 00CW281)
Breckenridge existed originally as a mining town, but its modem
economy is heavily based on skiing in the winter and tourism in the
summer. Situated along the Blue River above Dillon Reservoir,
Breckenridge has invested heavily in restoring and improving the river
to clean up old mining wastes and restore a more natural channel with
improved habitat for fish. In the process, it constructed trails along the
river for hiking and biking. It saw the addition of a boating park as
another way it could increase the value of the river to the community
and attract additional visitors during the non-ski season. The idea for
the boating park originated with the Town's Open Space Committee.
The Breckenridge Town Council subsequently authorized construction
of a park with fifteen structures that extend approximately 1800 feet
down the river."' The structures were designed for optimal performance at flows of 500 cfs.Y'
On December 28, 2000, the Town of Breckenridge filed an application seeking conditional water rights to protect the flows for which the
structures had been designed and built."' The application provided
for the diversion of water of the Blue River at fifteen dam and water
deflector structures for use by kayaks, canoes, rafts, and other forms of
recreational boating and floating.'
Claimed beneficial uses for the
whitewater park included all forms of boating and floating, piscatorial,
and general recreational uses."4 Objections were filed by the CWCB,
the State and Division Engineers, and the Homestake Project."5 Again,
Trout Unlimited filed a supporting statement so that it would have
standing to participate in the case."6
C. WATER COURT PROCEEDINGS

With both the Vail and Breckenridge cases filed in Water Division 5
and involving many of the same parties, Judge Thomas W. Ossola
agreed to a case management order in June, 2001, under which the
109. Id.
110. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Water Court at 2, In
re Application for Water Rights of the Town of Breckenridge, No. 00CW281 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5June 5, 2002) [hereinafter Decree, In reTown of Breckenridge].
111.
Id. at 4-5.
112. Id. at 1-2.
113. Id. at2.
114. Id. at 1-2, 5-6.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
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trials in the two cases would be held consecutively, beginning with the
Vail case."1 7 Trials were scheduled for May, 2002."8
The State filed a motion for summary judgment in both cases, asserting the same arguments it was pressing in the Golden appeal that a
recreation right could only be decreed as a beneficial use for water that
was impounded at a dam. "9 The State also filed a motion in limine
asking the Court to exclude any reference to the stipulated decree that
the CWCB had consented to for the in-channel diversion water right
2
sought by Littleton for boating structures on the South Platte River.
The Northern District filed a motion for summary judgment in the
Vail case arguing that the District, as a water and sanitation district organized under the Colorado Special District Act, did not have statutory
authority to hold a water right for recreation purposes. 12 ' The Northern District further argued that Ft. Collins allowed only a "boat passage"
recreation right, and that the Vail claim, if allowed at all, could not be
decreed for more than the 30 cfs required to pass a kayak through the
boating park."n Judge Ossola denied all of the foregoing motions, and
both the Vail and Breckenridge cases proceeded to trial. 22
The parties submitted trial briefs generally tracking the arguments
that had been made in the Golden case. Town officials from Vail and
Breckenridge explained the importance of their respective boating
parks to the communities. Kayakers and local business owners offered
supporting testimony. Dr. Danielson, the former State Engineer, once
again offered important expert testimony supporting the claimed recreation water rights and generally rebutting the State assertions.
117. See Decree, In re Town of Breckenridge, supra note 110, at 1; Decree, In re Eagle
River, supranote 105, at 1.
118. See Decree, In re Town of Breckenridge, supra note 110, at 1; Decree, In re Eagle
River, supra note 105, at 1.
119. See State 56(h) Motion for Determination of Question of Law, In re Application
for Water Rights of the Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist. & In re Application for
Water Rights of the Town of Breckenridge, Nos. 00CW259 & 00CW281 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. 5 Mar. 8, 2002).
120. See State's Motion in Limine Regarding the Littleton Boating Course at 1, In re
Application for Water Rights of the Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist. & In re Application for Water Rights of the Town of Breckenridge, Nos. OOCW 259 & OOCW 281
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5 Apr. 22, 2002). In 2000, the City of Littleton and the
South Suburban Park and Recreation District obtained a decree for three boat chutes
located in the South Platte River below Chatfield Dam. The chutes are decreed for
100 cfs. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Ruling of the Referee and Decree of the
Water Court, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Littleton and the So.
Suburban Park & Recreation Dist., No. 94CW273 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Sept. 5,
2000).
121.
See Order Denying Opponents' Motions for Summary Judgment and Determination of Questions of Law at 1, In re Application for Water Rights of the Eagle River
Water & Sanitation Dist. & In re Application for Water Rights of the Town of Breckenridge, Nos. 00CW259 & 00CW281 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5 Apr. 17, 2002).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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For its part, the State continued to assert that the claims were impermissible instream flows, that the boating park structures could not
constitute diversion structures sufficient to sustain an appropriative
water right, and, in the alternative, if such rights were allowed at all,
that the water court must impose a "duty of water" to limit the size of
the rights.
D. THE WATER COURT DECISIONS
The District Court Judge for Water Division 5 awarded decrees for
the claimed flow rates for both boating parks, up to 400 cfs for Vail'24
and 500 cfs for Breckenridge between the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 8:00
p.m.' 25 Moreover, the court specifically found that the District had the
authority needed to apply for-and hold-recreational water rights for
customers within its service area."n The court only denied piscatorial
uses as an independent basis for the claimed water rights."n In granting the recreational water rights, Judge Ossola entered decrees which
contained many of the same factual findings and determinations
reached by Judge Hays in the Golden case. The State immediately
filed appeals to the Colorado Supreme Court in both cases.
E. THE VAIL AND BRECKENRIDGE APPEALS

The briefing generally tracked the same arguments made in the
Golden case. Among other issues, the State argued that prior to enactment of SB 216 there was no authority to allow any party other than
the CWCB to appropriate RICDs. Vail concluded its argument with
the statement: "People do not travel to Vail to kayak the Park for its
minimum water."
F. ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT
The Colorado Supreme Court set oral argument for both cases for
May 3, 2003. While the Golden case had already been argued, it was
clear the court was considering all three cases together.
Counsel for Vail and Breckenridge began by noting the court was
considering two more decisions by a different water judge that fully
upheld claims for recreational in-channel water rights as a matter of
basic Colorado water law, just as the judge had in the Golden case.
Counsel recounted why these decisions had been made, and why they
should be upheld. Beginning with the issue of diversion, he pointed
out that under both the Colorado statutory definition of diversion and
124.
125.
126.
127.

Decree,
Decree,
Decree,
Decree,

In re Eagle River, supra note
In re Town of Breckenridge,
In re Eagle River, supra note
In re Town of Breckenridge,

105, at 4, 8.
supranote 110, at 4, 8.
105, at 3.
supranote 110, at 6.
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the interpretation of this provision in the Ft. Collins decision, inchannel diversions exist where (1) a structure (2) functions as designed (3) to control water for beneficial use. With respect to the reasonableness of the claims, counsel noted that, after lengthy trials, two
different water court judges in three cases held the amounts claimed to
be reasonable within the factual context of each case. Reasonableness
must be evaluated in the context of the appropriators' intent to develop the best possible boating park, and the amount of water appropriated was in fact the minimum necessary for the intended purpose.
Moreover, the evidence of the direct correlation between flow and use
was unrebutted. Next, counsel argued the passage of SB 216 had undercut the entire basis for the State's appeals. The bill clearly confirmed the legitimacy of recreational in-channel diversions.
Vail and Breckenridge returned to what they termed the "essence"
of the State's opposition: that recreation is a lesser form of water right
that should be entitled to a lesser amount of water. The State sought
to limit recreation to some minimum experience, without regard for
the intentions of the appropriator. In fact, towns like Vail and
Breckenridge provide a world-class recreational experience for skiing,
a quality experience essential to their economies. Recreation represents the economic future for resort communities in Colorado, and
increasingly the entire State. Whitewater parks bring people to Colorado in times when tourism is otherwise low. People come looking for
the best possible boating experience. Higher flows enhance the experience and bring more users. As summarized by counsel for Vail and
Breckenridge, "the greater the flow, the greater the dough, for the
State as a whole."
The towns went on to argue that the non-consumptive, in-channel
appropriations represented the ultimate in achieving maximum utilization of the State's waters. For the most part, such appropriations simply add another use to water that is already moving to senior uses
downstream. It adds a new nonconsumptive use that is already claimed
downstream or must be delivered under Colorado's compact delivery
obligations. New appropriations always have the effect of limiting what
others may do in the future. Such is the nature of the prior appropriation doctrine. But the test of value has always been the willingness of
the user to invest the time and money necessary to put water to beneficial use. Here, three public entities had made considerable investments to appropriate and use water in furtherance of their citizens'
economic and social well being.
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VI. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN GOLDEN,
BRECKENRIDGE, AND VAIL
With Justice Hobbs not participating, the Colorado Supreme Court
deadlocked 3-3 on whether to affirm the decisions of the two water
courts in the three different cases."l ' The effect of an equally divided
court is to affirm the lower court decisions by operation of law, pursuant to Colorado Appellate Rule 35(e)." Thus, the decision of the Water Court for Water Division No. 1 became final, as did the decisions in
Water Division No. 5. The Golden, Vail, and Breckenridge boating
parks were protected with decreed water rights, and the Denver and
local newspapers heralded this as a victory for recreation water with
front page banner headlines." ° The next round of legal battles would
be fought under the terms established in SB 216.
VII. THE CWCB'S RICD RULES UNDER SB 216
Allegedly in conformity with the mandate of SB 216, the CWCB
adopted Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules on November 8,
2001."' The rules require the applicant to submit a copy of its water
court application to the Board within thirty days after filing.'3 2 The
rules listed a total of twenty-five findings the Board may make in its
consideration of the five statutory factors.'
By way of introduction to
this list of findings, the rules stated:
If the Board determines that the amount of water sought for a RICD
does not represent the stream flow necessary to provide a reasonable
recreation experience in and on the water and/or that the RICD does
not divert, capture, and control water in its natural course or location
with physical control structures, then the Board shall note that determination in its written recommendation to the water court and
specifically
preserve the Board's authority to argue these issues in wa34
ter court.

128. See State Eng'r v. Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist., 69 P.3d 1028, 1029
(Colo. 2003) (en banc); State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027, 1028 (Colo. 2003)

(en banc).
129.

See Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist., 69 P.3d at 1029; City of Golden, 69 P.3d at

1028.
130. See Howard Pankratz, Recreational Water Use Buoyed: Colorado High Court Lets 3
Towns Use Riversfor Kayak Courses, DENVER POST, May 20, 2003, at Al.

131.

See Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules, 2

COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-3 (Nov. 2001), superseded by Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,
Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules, 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-3 (Nov. 15, 2005).

132.
133.
134.

Id. 6.
Id. 7.
Id.
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In addition, the rules identified twelve types of information the applicant should provide to assist the Board in its evaluation. '
In 2003, the Board adopted the "Recreational In-Channel Diversion ('RICD') Policy Regarding Technical Criteria."'" It referred to
the criteria as a set of "minimum guidelines to evaluate whether an
RICD should be granted and under what conditions the CWCB should
recommend approval of an RICD. '3 7 The CWCB suggested applicants
should follow the criteria for determining a "reasonable flow rate for a
recreational course design that utilizes stream flow in the most efficient
manner possible."'" The guidance "recommends" a flow rate in the
range of 50 to 350 cfs without regard for the size of a river or stream. "'
It suggests a flow rate that exceeds the fortieth percentile flow during
the intended time period (that is, a flow at the structure that would be
equaled or exceeded sixty percent of the time) would be per se "unreasonable."'"
In short, the rules were an effort to accomplish administratively
what the CWCB was unable to do through the legislative process or in
court-undermine RICDs and at the same time, make the administrative process so cumbersome and expensive that local communities
would be deterred from even trying to appropriate such rights.
VIII. SORTING OUT THE PROCESS: THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION IN THE GUNNISON CASE
In 2002, the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District
("Upper Gunnison") filed an application for water rights for the Gunnison River Whitewater Course, consisting of six separate structures to
concentrate and control the flows of the Upper Gunnison River for
beneficial use. 41 The application sought conditional rights to use flows
42
between May 1 and September 30 ranging from 270 cfs to 1500 cfs.1

Identified beneficial uses were boating (including but not limited to
kayaking, rafting, and canoeing) and general recreational uses. The
Upper Gunnison claim was the first significant RICD application filed

135.

Id. 8.

136.

COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., RECREATIONAL IN-CHANNEL DIVERSION
POLICY REGARDING TECHNICAL CRITERIA (Nov. 21, 2003), available at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICD/CWCB RICD 12 1 2003.pdf.
137. Id. at 1.

("RICD")

138.
139.

Id. at 2.
Id, at 4-5.

140. Id. at5.
141. See Application for Surface Water Rights for Recreational In-Channel Uses, In re
Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., No.
02CW38 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4 Mar. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Application, In re
Gunnison].

142.

Id. at 3.
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under SB 216 and submitted to the CWCB under it SB 216 agency
rules.
The CWCB review process focused heavily on the flow rates that, in
its view, would constitute the minimum necessary to provide a reasonable recreation experience. In contrast to the flows sought by the applicant, the CWCB staff recommended flows of 250 cfs for May, August,
and September and 500 cfs forJune and July.'43 It based these recommendations on statements in the Upper Gunnison's expert's report
that whitewater kayaking could occur at 250 cfs, as well as balance
needs for future development with the applicant's interest in providing
a reasonable recreation experience.'" Staff recommended that any call
under the water right in June and July be regarded as "futile" if it
would not produce the full 500 cfs.'45 In its written findings and recommendations to the water court, the Board stated its view that the
minimum stream flow necessary to provide a reasonable recreation
experience was 250 cfs from May through September and zero cfs the
rest of the year.'46
. Rejecting the CWCB position, the Division 4 Water Court granted
the Upper Gunnison the conditional water rights requested. 7 In its
conclusions, the court acknowledged the presumption entitled to the
adverse CWCB findings, but found that the Upper Gunnison had
brought forth sufficient contrary evidence to overcome the presumptions.'" It noted the CWCB had not addressed the flow rates claimed
by the applicant, and in that regard had not presented the findings of
fact called for under SB 216. The court went on to state that it would
not "second guess" the Upper Gunnison's requested amounts of water. "' 9 The court granted the decree for conditional water rights for the
course in substantially the amounts claimed.'"

143.

Memorandum from Rod Kuharich et al. to Colo. Water Conservation Bd. re:

The Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist.'s Recreational In-Channel Diversion Application 2 (Sep. 3, 2002), available at http://cwcb.state.co.us/

WaterSup-

ply/RICD/UpperGunnsonStaffRecommendation.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2-3.
146.

Findings and Recommendations of the Colo. Water Conservation Bd. to the

Water Court at 2, In re Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy Dist., No. 02CW38 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4 Oct. 1, 2002), available at
http: //cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICD/gunnisonfinalfindingsandrecommendati
on.pdf.
147. Decree at 4, In re Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy Dist., No. 02CW38 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4 Dec. 26, 2003).

148.

Id. at 8.

149. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 13-20, In re Application for
Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., No. 02CW38 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4 Dec 26, 2003).
150. Decree, In re Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District, supra note 147.
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The CWCB appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court. Among
other matters, the State argued that under SB 216 the water court must
uphold all presumptively valid CWCB findings unless rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence.' The State also asserted SB 216 directed the
CWCB, not an applicant, to determine whether the amount claimed is
the minimum stream flow necessary to serve an applicant's intended
reasonable recreation experience.'
In addition to the six parties participating in the appeal, the case
drew numerous amicus parties, twenty-four in total, again roughly
evenly split between proponents and opponents of recreational water
rights.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that both the CWCB and the
water court failed in certain respects to follow the requirements of SB
216."' The court rejected the CWCB assertion of "objective" authority
to determine the appropriate minimum stream flow.' 4 The court directed the CWCB must review the application in the form submitted by
the applicant: "As such, we hold that the General Assembly intended
for the CWCB to function as a narrowly constrained fact-finding and
advisory body when it reviews RICD applications, rather than in an unrestricted adjudicatory role."'55 Because of the manner in which the
CWCB conducted its review, the water court "received no guidance
from the CWCB about how Applicant's plans might affect the five
statutory factors under consideration."'56 Finding confusion in the record respecting the actual findings and recommendations of the
CWCB, the court concluded:
No matter which way one views the record, the CWCB's limitation of
Applicant's claimed RICD to 250 cfs was in clear violation of the plain
language of SB 216, which requires the Board to review the application strictly as submitted by the applicant, make the requisite statutory
findings
of fact, and formulate a recommendation to the water
57
court.

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the Division 4 Water Court's
handling of the presumptive effect of CWCB findings under SB 216.2"
The court specifically rejected the State's assertion that its findings
could only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. In the words
of the court: "By urging a higher standard such as clear and convincing
151.

Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy

Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005).
152. Id.

153.
154.

Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 593.

155.

Id.

156.
157.

Id. at 594.
Id. at 596.

158.

Id. at 597.
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evidence or arbitrary and capricious review, the CWCB is fashioning
for itself the role of an administrative adjudicatory agency or a quasijudicial body-a role which... was specifically rejected by the General
Assembly."5 9
The court did note, however, that SB 216 puts in place a "minimum stream flow" standard for RICDs, and determined that the water
court failed to independently determine that this requirement had
been met:
In short, we hold that the starting point for the water court's analysis
of a RICD application is the definition of a RICD provided by the
General Assembly. Unless the application is limited to the minimum
stream flow for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water, it does not satisfy the beneficial use requirement, and the application cannot be granted.'60
The court then went on to consider the meaning of the phrases
"minimum stream flow" and "reasonable recreation experience." It
defined minimum stream flow as "the least necessary stream flow to
accomplish a given reasonable recreation experience ...

.,'

The court

noted the reasonableness of a recreation experience varies according
to the perspective of the appropriator.161 In its search for other guidance respecting a reasonable recreation experience, the court noted
that what is reasonable depends on the particular circumstances at
hand, particularly the availability of unappropriated water in the proposed reach of stream, as well as the needs of future upstream consumptive users. In the right circumstances, the court noted, a "worldclass" course claiming almost the entire flow of a stream could be "reasonable." 63
In conclusion, the court directed water courts to first make an objective determination concerning whether the application is for a reasonable recreation experience and then to determine the minimum
amount of stream flow necessary to accomplish that purpose.'" The
water court must then "carefully evaluate" the five statutory factors as
they bear on the acceptability of the application before making its final
determination."
The Gunnison court ultimately held that RICDs are to be evaluated
by water courts on a case-by-case basis. The court sifted this evaluation
down to three fundamental elements that an applicant must prove
159.

Id.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

599.
602.
602-03.
603.
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when seeking flows for a RICD. First, what was the recreation experience intended by the applicant? Second, is that recreation experience
reasonable given the available flows and stream characteristics? Third,
are the claimed flows the minimum amounts to achieve that recreation
experience? Again, the Colorado Supreme Court in Gunnison specifically contemplated decrees providing sufficient flows to support a
world-class course and a world-class recreation experience.
While the Supreme Court decision was a procedural setback for
Upper Gunnison as it involved a remand, the decision was a clear substantive victory for recreation water rights. The State, on the other
hand, was now 0-4 at both the trial court and Supreme Court level.
After spending hundreds of thousands of dollars of taxpayer money on
both sides, the State had yet to reduce a claimed RICD by a single cfs.
IX. CITY OF STEAMBOAT SPRINGS BOATING PARK- THE
FIRST TRIAL AFTER GUNNISON
The first RICD case tried after the Supreme Court's discussion and
analysis of SB 216 in the Gunnison decision was the claim by the City of
Steamboat Springs for its boating park on the Yampa River. The
CWCB's vehement opposition to the Steamboat claim was unprecedented.
The Yampa River flows through the heart of the City of Steamboat
Springs, and is one of the last rivers in the State that has not been
overappropriated. It is an extraordinary recreational and aesthetic
amenity of tremendous importance to the City. The idea for a boating
park on the Yampa emerged out of the combined interests of citizens,
City staff, commercial outfitters, and downtown businesses, and was
formalized within a broader Yampa River Management plan that the
City had been pursuing to preserve and protect the river corridor.
The City built two boating diversion structures, known as Charlie's
Hole and D-Hole, in a reach of the river near the downtown area. In
keeping with the image of its ski mountain, and the athletic heritage of
a small town that counts more than eighty Olympians as its current or
past residents, the City sought to build a facility that would draw boaters from around the state, the nation, and even internationally. It saw
the boating park as an important attraction during the spring and
summer months when there was no ski-related business. The concept
was to build a facility that would attract the widest possible range of
users with varying skill levels and boating interests. By the time of the
RICD application, the two structures had already acquired a national
reputation.
Given the high flows of the Yampa River, Mr. Lacy designed the two
Steamboat structures to operate at their optimal level at flows of over
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1700 cfs.'" The City claimed a RICD right that began with modest flow
claims in April, climbed to a maximum claim of 1700 cfs during a twoweek period during the spring runoff, and then extended through the
16 7
end of the summer with lesser amounts to preserve a tubing flow.

After a high flow season, tubing on the Yampa is an extremely popular
activity on the stretch of the river through the City.
While the CWCB had clearly been a consistent and zealous opponent of all the previous RICD water rights, it pulled out all the stops in
its opposition to the Steamboat claim. The CWCB's strategy was
clear-not only kill the Steamboat RICD, but at the same time make
the litigation process as expensive as possible. The CWCB strategy was
coordinated by the CWCB's "RICD Program Coordinator," who was a
former Colorado Assistant Attorney General, and implemented by
CWCB staff members and a team of three attorneys at the Attorney
General's office that worked virtually full-time on the case for an extended period.
Work on the case began with preparations for the CWCB hearing
on the five criteria required by SB 216. That hearing was held for two
days in May 2004 before a packed house in a large conference room at
the Steamboat Grand Hotel. After presentations by the city, the
CWCB, and many of the parties that filed statements of opposition to
the claim, as well as extensive periods of public comment, the CWCB
recommended that the claim be denied. It issued its written recommendation in June of 2004.'" While satisfied with the compact, access,
and instream flow protection factors required to be considered under
SB 216, the CWCB recommended against the claim because, in the
CWCB's opinion, the boating park was not in an appropriate stream
reach (this despite the fact the reach was selected by a river management plan seven years in the making), and did not serve the concept of
maximum utilization of Colorado's water resources."
Following the CWCB hearing, but well in advance of trial, the City
entered into extensive settlement negotiations with the objecting water
users in the Yampa River basin. The City pursued those settlement
negotiations to promote comity with its neighboring water users in the
basin, but also to address the direction from the Gunnison decision that
the reasonableness of any RICD claim would be judged, in part, by
166. Application for Surface Water Rights, In re Application of the City of Steamboat
Springs, No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 Dec. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Appli-

cation, In re City of Steamboat Springs].
167. Id. at 2.
168. Findings and Recommendations of the Colo. Water Conservation Bd. to the
Water Ct., In reApplication for Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No.
03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 June 11, 2004), available at http://cwcb.state.
co.us/WaterSuply/RICD/Mayl 4SteamboatdraftRecommendationand%20Finding.

pdf.
169.

Id. at 2.
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whether it left room for upstream consumptive uses. 70 Eventually, the
city reached agreements with all of the other water users in the basin.
The settlements reduced the city's high flow claim of 1700 cfs down to
1400 cfs, and contained other terms and conditions to protect the existing and future water needs of upstream water users. Despite the objection of the CWCB to these settlements, they were approved by the
Water Court.' 7' Thereafter, only the State Engineer and the CWCB
continued to oppose Steamboat Springs, and they forced the case to
trial.
In response to the CWCB's continued strident opposition, the city
put together a "dream team" of expert and lay witnesses, which included city officials; members of the City's recreation water advisory
board; expert whitewater park designer Gary Lacy; many expert kayakers including three-time Olympian Scott Shipley, himself also a boating
park designer; former Colorado State Engineer Jeris Danielson; wellknown water resources engineer Gary Thompson; fisheries biologists;
and economists. The CWCB took the deposition of all of these witnesses, and many other people. In all, the parties took more than
twenty depositions.
The CWCB also perpetuated its opposition with a series of pre-trial
motions. Among other objections, the CWCB argued in a pre-trial motion in limine that the water court should exclude all evidence concerning the economic value of the boating park to the City. 7 In this manner, the CWCB attempted to keep the water court from hearing from
the City's expert economist who put the value of the boating park to
the City 7at
approximately $7 million per year. The CWCB's motion was
3
denied.'
The CWCB asked the court to dismiss the RICD claim and void all
of the settlements that the City had reached with other water users on
the grounds that the City violated a fiduciary duty it owed its citizens
when it agreed to limit its RICD right in the settlements with other wa-

170. See id. The Court suggested an analysis of reasonableness "will vary from application to application depending on the stream involved and the availability of water
within the basin." Upper Gunnison, 109 P.3d at 602.
171. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Ct. at 9, In re
Application for Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No. 03CW86
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 Mar. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Amended Decree, In re City
of Steamboat Springs].
172. Accompanying Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, In re Application for
Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 May 2, 2005).
173. Order Denying CWCB and State Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, In re
Application for Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No. 03CW86
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6June 8, 2005).
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ter users."' The court also denied this motion, and the case proceeded
to a two-week trial."'
The State brought twelve stuffed binders of exhibits to the trial
with over 600 exhibits."6 The court heard from all of the City's witnesses, despite the CWCB's motion to prevent former Olympic kayaker
Scott Shipley from testifying. In the court's eventual oral ruling from
the bench, Judge Michael O'Hara cited Mr. Shipley's testimony as particularly persuasive. '
The court also heard from the CWCB's "recreation experts" and
considered the data they had collected regarding use at the boating
park. The court heard extensive testimony from the CWCB's expert
on whitewater park design, who argued that more work and money
should have been invested by the City in the design process for the
boating park, and suggested that it might have been possible to design
the structures to achieve the same boating experience at lower flow
rates. At the close of trial, the court issued a rare and extensive ruling
from the bench.
In that oral ruling, the court discussed the Gunnison decision and
the five criteria required to be considered under SB 216. Again, the
CWCB had already recommended in the City's favor on three of these
issues. As for the two adverse CWCB recommendations, the court concluded that the City had overcome the presumptive weight accorded
the recommendations on the appropriate stream reach and maximum
utilization criteria.78' Concerning the CWCB's attempt to tell the City
that the reach of the Yampa River it selected for the boating park was
not appropriate, the court said the following: "The Court finds that
there was evidence presented by the Applicant that this was not only
the appropriate stream reach, but the only available stream reach for
this use on the Yampa River within the municipal boundaries."'79
With regard to the amount of money spent on the design process,
the court held:
This Court emphatically rejects the implication that this application
should be denied because the City did not spend enough money on
this project or that expenditures of hundreds of thousands of dollars
is de facto necessary to support such an application. I find that there

174. Order Denying State Motion to Dismiss, In re Application for Water Rights of
the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6).
175. Id.
176. Reporter's Transcript at 2 11.20-23, In re Application of the City of Steamboat
Springs, Case No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 Oct. 28, 2005).
177. See id. at 13 11.22-25.
178. Id. at 10 11.1-3.
179. Id. at 12!1. 4-8.
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is absolutely nothing improper with the municipality seeking a world
class facility at, to quote the State, WalMart prices.'s8
In conclusion, the court stated, "[t] his Court finds that the evidence presented by Applicant has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that Applicant is entitled to the decree sought."8
The final decree, signed March 13, 2006, confirmed absolute water
rights for the City in the amounts requested for boating, kayaking, inner-tubing, rafting, and canoeing.82 The decree recognized the City's
purpose in constructing the park was to "create a recreational amenity
that would draw boaters and spectators to the region. Specifically, the
Boating Park was built to generate greater tourist revenue outside the
ski season by meeting the recreational boating and tubing demands of
the City's citizens and visitors, and creating a venue for special
events."'
The claimed flow amounts at the identified time intervals
were found to "meet these reasonable objectives. ''
The decree specifically addressed each of the five statutory criteria
set forth in SB 216, finding in all cases that the evidence supported the
City's application,' and that substantial unappropriated water remained for future upstream development, including exchanges."0
In summary, despite its vigorous opposition that included numerous motions, objections, depositions, the ordeal of a two day administrative hearing and a two week trial, Judge O'Hara ruled from the
bench the State failed to reduce the City's claim by a single drop of
water. It was such a devastating loss that it paved the way for the ascendance of more reasonable voices within the CWCB and a narrow
majority vote not to appeal.
X. THE CWCB RESPONSE TO THE GUNNISON DECISION: NEW
RICD RULEMAKING
In response to the Gunnison decision, the CWCB initiated a rulemaking process in the summer of 2005 to revise its existing RICD rules.
Remarkably, the new rules imposed a far greater burden on the applicant than the previous rules. The statute only requires the applicant to
provide a copy of its water court application to the CWCB.'87 Yet, the
new CWCB agency rules broke the five statutory review factors into
forty-five "sub-factors" for Board consideration, and required appli-

180.

Id. at 1411. 10-16.

181.

Id. at 1511.22-25.

182.

Amended Decree, In re City of Steamboat Springs, supranote 171.

183.
184.

Id. at 5.
Id.

185.

Id. at 6-7.

186.

Id. at 7.

187.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(5) (2006).
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cants to provide all information necessary for an extensive CWCB
evaluation on most of these forty-five sub-factors.' "
For example, the effect of an application on Colorado's ability to
develop its compact entitlements was given ten sub-elements."' These
elements went well beyond a finding of direct impairment (i.e., because of this appropriation, Colorado will be unable to develop its
compact entitlement) to a review of any and all potential uses of water
in a given basin, and whether such uses might be impaired by the application. Thus, under the rules the CWCB is to consider "exchange
opportunities... that may be adversely impacted .... ," the effect on "reasonably foreseeable uses," whether the application "shields water from
consumptive use" otherwise available, and whether consumptive use
"opportunities" upstream would be impaired."'
All appropriations of water necessarily have such effects under a
priority system. The very purpose of a prior appropriation water right
is to preserve a claim to a particular portion of water as against the effects of subsequent appropriations. These "considerations" clearly go
well beyond the statutory charge given to the CWCB and reflected the
CWCB's intention to evaluate potential other future uses of the water
claimed by the RICD, rather than determine compact impairment.
The CWCB rules similarly expanded the other statutory review criteria into multiple requirements. The "maximum utilization" factor,
for instance, was divided into twenty subparts, and the rules required
applicants to submit information on each one."'
In the Gunnison case, the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly admonished the CWCB for substituting its judgment about the flow rate
Nevertheless, the new rules once again
proposed by the applicant.'
called for the board to consider the appropriateness of the claimed
flow rate, both in the context of maximum utilization and whether the
amount claimed is the "minimum." 9 As further described in the
"Statement of Basis and Purpose" accompanying the rules, the Board's
purpose was to enable it to address "the ultimate policy question" of
how much water is needed, "to determine where in the middle of the
spectrum the RICD claim should be to constitute the minimum stream
188. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules, 2
COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-3, at 1 7 (Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://www.cwcb.state.

co.us/watersupply/RICDRules.htm.
189. Id. 7(a).
190. Id., 1 7(a)(v), (vii), (viii), (ix).
191. Id. 7(e).
192. See Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
does not give ...
Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 595 (Colo. 2005) ("SB 216, in its final form ....

the CWCB any authority to dictate a flow rate or recreation experience for RICD water
rights.").
193. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules 1
7(e) (vii), (f).
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flow for a reasonable recreation experience."' 4 Yet, the Colorado Supreme Court had just rejected the CWCB's assertion that SB 216 had
given the Board "the authority to objectively determine what stream
flow is minimally necessary in order to provide a reasonable recreation
experience."'" Again, the court held:
After a careful analysis of the plain language of SB 216 as a whole, as
well as noting the legislative history, we hold that the General Assembly intended for the CWCB to analyze the application purely as submitted by the applicant, rather than to objectively determine what
recreation experience would be reasonable, 196and what minimum
stream flow would meet that recreational need.
Colorado often is referred to as a "pure" prior appropriation
state.'97 That reference reflects the state's long-standing policy of allowing the would-be user of water to establish its claim to public water,
subject only to court ratification that the appropriation meets certain
statutory requirements, rather than the administrative allocation system using permits followed by most prior appropriation states.' " Without doubt, the Colorado General Assembly modified this traditional
policy in the case of RICDs by providing for a partial, fact-finding review by the CWCB prior to water court determination. But that modification, as the Colorado Supreme Court found in the Gunnison case,
was a limited one-making the CWCB a "narrowly constrained factfinding and advisory body ... , The nature of the review called for by
the CWCB rules went far beyond the CWCB's statutorily-directed role.
Adoption of these rules represented an astonishing action by a
board that had just been reprimanded by the Colorado Supreme Court
for exercising authority not provided in SB 216. Apparently, the
CWCB failed to read the Gunnison decision or blatantly chose to ignore
it. But to those involved in this controversy, this action was entirely
consistent with the CWCB's behavior in its publicly-funded campaign
against recreation water rights.'
194.

COLO. WATER CONSERVATION

BD.,

REcREATIONAL IN-CHANNEL DIVERSIONS, RULES

5 (2005), available at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICD/RICDSTATEMENTOFBASISANDPURP
OSEFINAL1105 FINAL.pdf.
195. Upper Gunnison, 109 P.3d at 593.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Thompson v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 575 P.2d 372, 381 (Colo.
1978) (en banc) (noting that Colorado only "rejected the pure prior appropriation
doctrine as to ground water").
198. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 138 (3d ed. 1997) ("Every state
but Colorado has vested authority in an administrative agency.").
199. Upper Gunnison, 109 P.3d at 593.
200. As a state agency, the CWCB has used state funding to oppose applications by
local governments. Not only has the CWCB committed considerable staff time to opposing RICDs, it has hired consultants and paid the costs of attorneys and paralegals
AND

REGULATIONS,

STATEMENT

OF BASIS AND PURPOSE
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XI. SENATE BILL 62
After the filing of the Steamboat Springs application, but prior to
the trial in that case, Senator Taylor introduced SB 62 in the 2005
Colorado General Assembly."°' This was an outright effort by Senator
Taylor, Yampa Basin lawyer Tom Sharp, and the Upper Yampa Water
Conservancy District to undercut and legislatively defeat the Steamboat
RICD. It attempted to do this by adding as a factor for CWCB review
whether the RICD would "affect" development of future upstream
storage and water development projects. 12 The bill also declared water
diverted by a RICD to be wasted unless at least ten kayakers were using
the water at or near the structures. 3° It would have restricted the ability of the RICD to place a call unless the structure controls 100% of the
water, and concentration of flow would not constitute control of water.' Finally, it would have limited in-channel recreation to kayaking
only.' °0 A subsequent amendment would have restricted flow rates for
RICDs to no more than 350 cfs.'
Because the bill would have effectively undermined future water
rights for boating parks, the recreation community believed the only
option was its defeat, not its amendment. This opposition continued,
even when the bill was amended to exclude all existing applications
and decrees for RICDs. With the support of most traditional water
interests, the bill passed out of the Senate and through the House Agriculture Committee. However, as the result of an intensive lobbying

from the Office of Attorney General. As an example, we used Open Records requests
to obtain the identifiable direct costs of the CWCB's opposition to the Steamboat
Springs' application in Case No. 03CW86 between January 2004 and November 2005.
Payments to consultants totaled $69,108. Attorneys from the Colorado Department of
Law (Office of the Attorney General) billed 1,736 hours; legal assistants billed 791

hours. Assuming an average hourly rate of $100 (well below rates charged in the private sector), the CWCB spent $252,700 of taxpayer money on lawyers. No information
was available on the hours committed by CWCB staff or the members of the Board, or
on the expenses associated with holding a two-day hearing in Steamboat or participating in a ten-day trial in Steamboat. Nor does this accounting take into consideration
the additional expense incurred by the City of Steamboat Springs as a result of being
forced to go to trial. Supporting records on file with author.
201.

S.B. 62, 65th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005) (introduced version Jan. 14,

2005).
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 2
Id. at 3
Id. at 3
Id. at 4

206.

S.B. 62, 65th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 2 11. 21-24 (Colo. 2005) (engrossed

11.9-10.
11.7-14.
11.15-23.
11.20-22.

version Feb. 28, 2005).

Issue 2

RECREATION WATER RIGHTS

campaign by a coalition of recreation water interests,207 the bill was finally killed on the House floor.' 8
XH. THE CHAFFEE COUNTY CLAIM (WATER DIVISION 2, CASE
NO. 04CW129)
The Upper Arkansas River in Chaffee County has become one of
the nation's premier locations for water-based recreation.' Commercial river use alone had an estimated economic impact of $64.7 million
on the Arkansas River in the year 2006." '° The Arkansas River in Chaffee County is not only a major center for commercial boating, it is also
widely used for private boating and recreational fishing. Chaffee
County also hosts the longest running boating event in the country
(Fibark boating festival) that draws large crowds to the City of Salida
every year.
The boating parks built in the City of Salida and Town of Buena
Vista provide a high quality recreation experience for a variety of different types of boats and users. The rationale for obtaining water
rights for the boating parks was the same as for every community-to
protect flows at the boating parks and, in the process, help protect the
local economy. The boating parks are a significant component of the
economic value of the Arkansas River in Chaffee County. Government
officials were concerned that the pressure on the upper Arkansas River
to provide water supplies for various users, including Front Range municipalities, that had been experienced over the past thirty years would
continue to grow in the future, leaving the boating parks vulnerable to
future water supply projects. In essence, the RICD application was an
effort to help protect Chaffee County's local economy.
Prior to filing for recreational water rights, Chaffee County officials
met with the recreational boating community, local business leaders,
and even the major water users on the Arkansas River that would later
become the objectors. After conducting a hearing on the matter,
Chaffee County filed an application for water rights for the two parks

207. Included in the coalition were seventeen local governments, six water districts,
sixteen nonprofits, and numerous businesses, associations, and individuals.
208. Summarized History for Bill Number SB05-062, http://www.leg.state.co.us/
Clics2005a/csl.nsf/BillFoldersAll?OpenFrameSet (select "Senate Bills 051-100"; then
follow "H.B. 05-062 History" hyperlink).
209. Colorado State Parks and the Bureau of Land Management cooperatively operate the Arkansas Headwaters Recreation Area, including almost 150 miles of the river
and adjacent lands. See Colo. State Parks, Arkansas Headwaters Recreation Area,
http://parks.state. co.us/Parks/ArkansasHeadwaters/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
210. COLO. RIVER OUTFITTERS ASS'N, ExEcuTlrVE SUMMARY: COMMERCIAL RIVER USE IN
COLORADO - 2006 YEAR END REPORT 7 (2006), available at http://www.croa.org/pdf/
2006 Commerical Rafting Use Report.ndf.
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on December 30, 2004.1 Statements of opposition were filed by seventeen parties.2 Some of the more active objectors in the case included
trans-mountain diverters such as the Cities of Colorado Springs and
Aurora; in-basin water users such as Pueblo Board of Water Works,
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("SEWCD") and
Upper Arkansas Water Conservancy District; and State agencies such as
the CWCB, Colorado Department of Natural Resources ("CDNR") and
the State and Division Engineers.
The CWCB held its administrative review hearing under SB 216 in
May 2005, despite requests by many parties to postpone the hearing to
allow further settlement discussions that had started before the appli1 3 At the hearing held in Salida, many citizens
cation was even filed."
showed up and voiced their support for the application. In fact, not
one public comment was made against the claim. After the hearing,
the CWCB postponed making its recommendations to allow the parties
time to continue settlement negotiations.
The Arkansas River is a highly managed, intensively used source of
water that, in addition to being the focal point for the local, recreational-based economy, provides water for both agriculture and municipalities in the upper basin, the Front Range, and the eastern plains of
Colorado. Although existing in-basin and trans-basin uses limit opportunities for new uses of water on the Arkansas River, the potential for
large exchanges of existing water rights to points upstream of the boating parks clearly existed." ' The biggest challenge for Chaffee County
was to shape a water right that would protect its interests in the boating
parks against future exchanges and protect its local economy associated with these parks, at the same time recognizing the desire of other
communities and water users to have flexibility in developing their future water supplies.

211. Application for Surface Water Rights for Chaffee County at 2-5, Case No. 04CW
129 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 2 Dec. 30, 2004). The Salida Park consists of two structures located within 400 feet of one another in the City of Salida. Id. at 2-3. The
Buena Vista Park at that time had a single structure, but the town intended to build up

to three additional structures downstream of the original structure. Id. at 3. Claimed
beneficial uses were all recreational uses, including boating, kayaking, tubing, rafting,
floating, canoeing, and other such general recreational uses. Id. at 4.
212. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Ct. at 1, In re Application for Water Rights of Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 2
Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Decree, In re Chaffee County.

213.

Findings of Fact and Recommendations of the Colo. Water Conservation Bd. to

the Water Ct. at 1, In re Application of Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. 2 Apr. 14, 2006) [hereinafter CWCB Findings, In re Chaffee County].

214. The Otero pump station is located upstream of both boating parks and is used
to take water out of the Arkansas River basin for use by the Cities of Colorado Springs
and Aurora. In addition, Twin Lakes, Turquoise Reservoir, and Clear Creek Reservoir

are located upstream of both boating parks.

Issue 2

RECREATION WATER RIGHTS

Chaffee County ultimately negotiated a settlement with all of the
water users. The resulting compromise is a multi-tiered water right
that includes the largest recreational water rights in Colorado. The
water rights for both parks are measured at a gage just downstream of
Salida, and consist of: (1) 1800 cfs for up to eight event days in June;
(2) 1400 cfs for up to thirty consecutive days picked each year from the
Friday before Memorial Day to the end of June ("30-Day Period"), except for event days during that time; (3) 700 cfs from July 1 through
August 15, and any time between the Friday before Memorial Day and
the end of June that is not part of the 30-Day Period; and (4) 250 cfs
from March 15 to the Thursday before Memorial Day, and from August 16 to November 15.15

Various objectors asserted they reasonably anticipated filing for exchanges upstream of the boating parks in the near future. These exchanges totaled approximately 140,000 acre-feet and are junior to the
boating park water rights. 26 As part of the settlement, however, Chaffee County agreed that so long as certain conditions were met, it would
reduce its call during the 30-Day Period (but not event days) from 1400
cfs to as low as 1200 cfs, to the extent its water rights prevented these
future exchanges.2 1 ' This 200 cfs reduction-roughly 12,000 acre-feet if

over the entire 30-Day Period-is available to any user in priority. In
addition, under certain very limited conditions, where some water users are seeking to replace storage levels reduced by drought conditions, Chaffee County agreed to reduce its call on event days to as low
as 1500 cfs, and during the 30-Day Period to as low as 1100 cfs on
weekends and 1000 cfs on weekdays.218
Negotiations in the case were complicated by the Upper Arkansas
Voluntary Flow Management Program ("VFMP"), a year-to-year, voluntary flow management program whereby the Bureau of Reclamation, in
concurrence with the SEWCD and CDNR, operates upstream reservoir
releases, primarily involving trans-mountain water, so as to manage
flows in the Arkansas River above Pueblo Reservoir for recreation and
fishery purposes." 9 Although the boating park water rights are distinct
from the VFMP, some parties were concerned that opposition to the
boating park water rights would jeopardize this voluntary agreement.
To help ensure consistency between the VFMP and the water rights,
Chaffee County agreed to use the same river gage used in the VFMP to
administer both boating park water rights. Chaffee County further
tailored portions of its water rights to be consistent with the target flow
levels of the VFMP. This included 700 cfs from July 1 to August 15,
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Decree, In re Chaffee County, supra note 212, at 4-5.
See generally id. at Ex. C (Memorandum of Understanding).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at Ex. C.
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and 250 cfs on the shoulder seasons. These recreational water rights
work in tandem with the VFMP by protecting the native flows that the
program is designed to supplement. In short, although Chaffee
County cannot call for storage releases under the VFMP to satisfy its
water rights, it can prevent junior water rights from diminishing river
flows below these targets.
With the assistance of SEWCD, CDNR, Trout Unlimited, Arkansas
River Outfitters Association and others, negotiations in the Chaffee
County case resulted in a five-year VFMP agreement that provides
more certainty for local outfitters and businesses. As part of the larger
settlement agreement, there was also a greater commitment obtained
from water users to exercise water rights in a manner consistent with
the VFMP and commitments from some parties on limitations with
respect to water rights that would otherwise be senior to the RICDs.
The CWCB re-convened its hearing in March, 2006, during which
it heard evidence on the settlement agreements that, although not
signed, had largely been approved in concept.' Based on these negotiated agreements, the CWCB had little choice but to recommend approval of the application. Thereafter, the settlements were finalized
and a final decree issued without a trial.21
XII. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WEIGHS IN AGAIN: SENATE
BILL 37
The defeat of SB 62 and questions raised in the Gunnison decision
prompted the 2005 Colorado General Assembly to ask the Water Resources Review Committee, a standing committee of senators and representatives that consider water matters for possible legislative action,
to hold hearings to determine the need for legislation addressing
RICDs.2 n The Committee held several hearings in the summer and
early fall at which numerous parties testified. An initial draft was generated that prompted active review and comment. The outcome of
this process was introduced in the 2006 General Assembly as SB 37."
The bill's sponsors were the co-chairs of the Committee (and also the
chairs of the Senate and House Agriculture committees), Senator Isgar
and Representative Curry.
One major change proposed by SB 37 was to reduce the CWCB's
review role. To this end, the bill proposed removing the requirement
that the CWCB hold a hearing, and replaced the hearing with a public
220.
221.

CWCB Findings, In re Chaffee County, supranote 213, at 1.
Decree, In re Chaffee County, supranote 212, at 1.

222.

See Water Res. Review Comm. 2005, Staff Reports and Committee Memoranda,

http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg dir/lcsstaff/2005/comsched/05WaterResourcesS

ched.htm.
223. S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (introduced version Jan.
11,2006).
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meeting."4 It also proposed eliminating from CWCB review the "appropriate stream reach and access factors" first established in SB 216,
as well as the catchall "such other factors as may be deemed appropriate. " 22' While the CWCB was still required to provide written findings
to the water court on the remaining three factors, it no longer would
make recommendations.' The water court was specifically directed to
deny an application if it found the RICD would "materially impair the
ability of Colorado to fully develop and place to consumptive beneficial
use its compact entitlements...."'
To help address the concerns raised by the Colorado Supreme
Court in the Gunnison decision respecting guidance to the water court
in evaluating the reasonableness of the proposed RICD appropriation,
the bill offered the following as factors for the water court to consider:
(1) "the flow needed to accomplish the claimed recreational use"; (2)
"benefits to the community"; (3) "the intent of the appropriator"; (4)
"stream size and characteristics"; and (5) "total stream flow available at
the control structures" at the time claimed.'
Two especially controversial provisions in the original bill precluded the State Engineer from administering a call for a RICD unless
at least ninety percent of the decreed rate of flow was present, and required the water court to retain jurisdiction of a decreed RICD for at
least twenty years.'
The original bill was significantly modified in both the Senate and
the House. On the Senate side, the primary bill sponsor, Senator Isgar, attempted a number of amendments to limit the RICD right, and
successfully reintroduced the word "minimum" into the definition of
RICD." On the other hand, the call threshold was lowered to eightyfive percent, and it was clarified that this was the amount that had to be
generated by a call for it not to be deemed futile."'
Perhaps the most significant change made in the House that was
ultimately enacted into law was the incorporation of an alternative provision quantifying the claimed RICD appropriation volumetrically and
comparing that volumetric amount to the total average historical volume of water that would have passed through the structures during the
proposed days of use. 2 If the volumetric quantity of the RICD does
224. Id. at 2 11.9-12.
225. Id. at 2 11.4-10.
226. Id. at 2 11.4-8.
227. Id. at 5 11.18-24.
228. Id. at 6 11.5-13.
229. Id. at 6 11.18-24.
230. S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. at 4 11.21-22 (Colo. 2006) (engrossed
version Mar. 2, 2006).
231. Id. at 7 11.3-7.
232. S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. at 7 11.19-24 (Colo. 2006) (revised version Mar. 2, 2006) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(13) (f) (2006)).
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not exceed fifty percent of the total average historical volume during
the claimed period of use, then the amendment provided the eightyfive percent call threshold limitation would not apply."'
Moreover, the retained jurisdiction provision was stricken in the
House and clarifying language was added to the applicability provision
to ensure SB 37 would not apply to RICDs with decreed conditional
rights. Thus, the bill would not apply when such rights are brought
back to water court for either a finding of reasonable diligence or to
make a conditional right absolute."l
As the Bill was finally enacted, everyone seemed to feel it was an acceptable compromise. Most hoped its enactment would put an end to
legislative attempts to kill RICDs. In the final analysis, SB 37 was an
important victory for proponents of recreation water rights. Despite
constitutionally doubtful limitations imposed on this kind of appropriation, the ability to appropriate water for RICDs was again confirmed by the legislature. Most importantly, in the space of a few short
years, proponents of water rights for recreation had pushed the law
from the State's claim that such water rights could not exist at all, to
legislative recognition that fifty percent or more of the historic flow in
a river was likely a reasonable flow amount. In addition, there was the
Supreme Court case law recognizing that, in the right circumstances, a
'world-class" course claiming almost all of the flow in a stream might
be reasonable.
XIV.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the end, recreational in-channel water rights won out because
they are a true beneficial use of water-Colorado's emerging heritage
and legacy. Recreation will only become more important to Colorado's economy in the future. RICDs provide a particular type of water-based recreation experience that not only serves growing demand
for this kind of activity, but promotes related economic development.
People are drawn to water, for recreation as well as for simple aesthetic
enjoyment.
Colorado water law is moving irretrievably into this changing
world, as it must. Taking the long view, it can be said much progress
has been made. From its modest origins acknowledging that a boat
chute through a dam could serve as a diversion of water for a beneficial
recreation use, to its current version under which fifty percent or more
of the volume of water in a stream may be appropriated during a specified period for boating use by a recreational in-channel diversion, the
law has broadened. In ten years, the bar moved from minimum
233.

S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. at 7 11.19-27 (revised version) (codified

at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(13) (f) (I)).
234. S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. at 8 11.9-12

(revised version).
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amount to float a boat (35 cfs in Fort Collins) to appropriations as
great as 1800 cfs and fifty percent or more of historic average flows (as
codified by SB 37).
Unnecessary constraints, both administrative and legislative, still
remain, however, and should be removed. Given the increasing importance of such uses of water, we believe these limitations will disappear, and RICDs will be treated like any other beneficial use of Colorado water.
Looking back on this ten-year struggle for recognition of recreational in-channel water rights, a number of important lessons can be
drawn. First, significant change does not come easily in the water
rights arena. Anyone seeking to step outside traditional notions of
consumptive beneficial uses should expect a tough fight.
Second, be careful if you seek legislative fixes-you may get more
than you bargained for. The CWCB learned this lesson the hard way
when it sought to legislate RICDs out of existence, only to legislatively
confirm their very existence and cause the political defeat of one of the
CWCB's most vigorous defenders.
Third, the stipulated settlements with actual water users entered in
almost all RICD cases demonstrate that traditional water court proceedings work and, ultimately, even traditional water users are often
able to set aside philosophical differences to derive a mutually acceptable settlement in a water court case.
Fourth, the CWCB and State Engineer efforts to derail RICDs
demonstrate why there should be no absolute state control of water or
of state water policy. The prior appropriation doctrine works and is
the guiding principle that should not be fundamentally altered.
Fifth, future claims for RICD water rights should largely ignore the
CWCB's rules regarding RICDs. These rules are beyond the scope of
the authority delegated to the agency by the legislature and will have
little impact on the final water court determination that will dictate the
scope of any RICD right.
Sixth, Colorado water law is adaptable to changing times. That is
its beauty and its essence. Colorado might be said to use a marketbased test for allocating water. That is, a use of water is warranted if
there is demand sufficient to support payment of the costs necessary to
make the use (and if unappropriated water is available). By that measure, there is no question many Colorado local governments believe
boating parks are an important and valuable use of water, and there
now have been numerous studies documenting the economic benefits
to local communities from their boating parks.
The traditional concern that failure to consume water constitutes
waste no longer applies. Legitimate, non-consumptive instream uses of
water are increasingly important as the availability of such flows declines and the demands for their use increase. In most respects RICDs
represent a particularly smart use of water. They meet a growing hu-
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man demand and produce economic benefits without consuming any
water. Every drop of water passing through a boating park is available
for use downstream. RICDs are a non-polluting use of water. RICDs
make possible an additional use of water with no effects on existing
uses-the very definition of maximum utilization of Colorado's water.m Most importantly, RICDs protect meaningful quantities of water
for Colorado's recreation based economy. Once again, "the greater
the flow, the greater the dough for the State as a whole."

235. The court-made doctrine of maximum utilization emerged in the context of
enabling development of out-of-priority groundwater. Fellhauer v. Colorado, 447 P.2d
986, 994 (Colo. 1969) (en banc). It was enunciated to provide a policy basis for allowing additional uses of water that would otherwise have been barred by a strict application of the priority doctrine to protect existing water rights. It is somewhat ironic that
it was used by the CWCB in this context in an attempt to prevent a legitimate nonconsumptive use of water that has no effect whatsoever on existing water rights.

